ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ,

OR,

Divine Goodneſs

Explicated and Vindicated

FROM THE

EXCEPTIONS

OF THE

ATHEIST:

Wherein alſo the Conſent of the *Graveſt Philoſophers*, with the *Holy*, and *Inſpired Penmen*, in many of the moſt important points of *Chriſtian Doctrine* is fully evinced.

By *Richard Burthogge*, Dr. in Phyſ.

Οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰμὶ εἰς, ὁ Θεός. Chriſt.

Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ ἐστὶν, ἢ μὴ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀεί. Hermes.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO THE

Moſt Honoured

ANDREW TREVIL, Eſq;

SIR,

OF all the Attributes are owned by the Deity, This whereon I have engag'd my Pen, is the moſt remarkable and Glorious. Which I undertook the rather, and with the more aſſurance, becauſe I knew that if I did come ſhort iu my Diſcourſes on it (as who ever enterpriz'd it muſt) I had my conſolation in my Subject.

It is Divine Goodneſs to accept of what a Perſon hath, and not of what he hath not. I know that God is great, as well as good, that he is in Heaven, and we on Earth; and that therefore as in our addreſſes to him, ſo in our Diſcourſes of him, our words ſhould be few. But I alſo know, what Cicero *obſerv'd before me, that he is* Opt. Max. *that he is firſt Good, and then Great, and that he glories in his Goodneſs, as his greateſt Excellency, [His making of his Sun to riſe on the Evil, and on the Good, and his ſending Rain on the Juſt, and on the unjuſt, is called his* Perfection, *and indeed is ſo, 'tis,* be you perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect.

Once, it is the Intereſt and Cauſe

of

of God I plead in this Eſſay, and ſo much, that all Religion is concerned in it. For 'tis an apprehenſion of the Goodneſſe, and Bounty, and Beneficence of God, that eſtabliſhed in Mens hearts doth powerfully tie them to Adore, Obey, and Serve him. There is Mercy (*ſayes the Royal Pſalmiſt*) with thee, that thou mayeſt be feared. *It was for this Reaſon that he prefaced the* Law *he gave the* Jewes, *with a Repitition of the benefits, which had accrued to them by him,* I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the Land of *Egypt*, out of the *Houſe* of Bondage, Thou ſhalt, *&c. Namely to imprint upon them a*

due ſence of all his Obligations and Engagements, that having firſt poſſeſſ'd them of a rational and well eſtabliſh'd Love, he might afterwards the better influence them by it, to a due reſpect to all his commands. [*'Tis*, if you love me keep my commands.] *And the Holy* Evangel, *wherein Almighty God is admirably repreſented as moſt infinitely Loving, Gratious, and Benigne, what other end, intention or deſign has it, but by ſo ample proof and Declaration of the Divine Love to prevail with man for his, that believing he may love, and loving he may ſerve and obey? This is the Evangellical Obedience; that of Faith, which workes by Love.*

Thus

Thus our Love to God it is the life of all our Devotion and Obedience to him, and his Benignity and kindneſſe unto us, it is the ground of all our love. And Sathan *knows it well enough, and therefore he is ſo induſtrious* (for we are not ignorant of his devices) *to inſtil into the minds of men, hard and frightful apprehenſions of the great God; as that he rules by will;* that *he hath no conſideration in the world of his Creatures comfort, but onely of his own* Glory, that *he made the greateſt part of Men to damne them, and triumphs in their Ruin; and* that *he cruelly exacts impoſſibilities, and obliges Men to come, when yet he knowes they cannot. And that* Evil One *is inimate enough*

nough with all our minds, to know that if he can but once perſwade them, that the Maſter, whom we are to ſerve is moſt Tyrannicall and hard, and that he reapeth, where he hath not ſown, and gathereth, where he hath not ſtrewed; *no queſtion, but we will away, and* dig and hide our Lords money, *as that unfaithful ſervant did.*

So much it is the intereſt of God and True Religion, that Divine Benignity be vindicated; a work as neceſſary now as ever, when Lucretius *is as much conſulted as* Moſes, *and when there are almoſt as many, who blaſphemouſly diſpute Divine Goodneſſe, as there are that ſeriouſly believe it. And it is with thoſe I principally deal.* *In*

In doing which I have endeavour'd to acquit my ſelf, not onely Philoſophically *by alledging Reaſons which Philoſophy, Common ſenſe, and the Natures of the things I treat of, do ſuggeſt to me, but alſo as a* Chriſtian, *by blending with thoſe other, ſuch conſiderations alſo as the ſacred Oracles (whereon I moſt relie) do prompt me with; not inſiſting on the former, (which yet too many do) but as they have the countenance and favour of the latter.*

This, Sir, *is what* I *offer you. Be pleaſed to accept an* Eſſay [*but a* Part *of that* whole *you have a Title to*] *which with thoſe deſigns, and this Furniture (ſuch as it is) doth lay it ſelf before you, at your feet? 'Tis its Ambition,*

to

to have a Perſon for its Patron, whom its Subject *hath for its Admirer. And it cannot eaſily deſpair of being owned by you, and ſo of being made* another *Inſtance of your great Goodneſs, of which its* Author *is already One, ſeeing to be ſo, it is enough to need it.*

And, Sir, *with this high Encouragement it is, that I preſume to own my ſelf in theſe circumſtances, in that capacity you long ago vouchſafed me the honour to be, even that of*

SIR,

Your moſt humble Servant,

Bowden near *Totnes*, Oct. 9. 1671. and Son Richard Burthogge.

An

AN *ADVERTISEMENT* TO THE READER.

THE Method I have taken in the following Diſcourſe, is to ſecond the evincements, which I urge from common Reaſon, or Nature, with the ſuffrage of the ſacred Oracles. Which that the Reader may not mis-interpret, and accuſe of want of judgement, ſeeing my pretences are againſt the Atheiſt, who believes not Scripture; he is to know, that there are *Reaſons* for the Atheiſt, which though to make them more perſpicuous, and convincing, I have backed with the verdicts of the graveſt *Philoſophers*, and to ſhew them to be alſo Scriptural, I have confirmed from the *Scriptures*; yet I inſiſt not

not on them with the Atheiſt, as they are Scriptural, but as they are Reaſons, Scriptural Reaſons. He may underſtand me, that I Inſiſt not with him on the Authority, but on the Reaſon of Scripture.

And yet truely taking on me to aſſert the Chriſtian Religion, and ſuch Apprehenſions of the Great God, as that obligeth us to have, I thought it point of Duty, not onely to produce Reaſons, and Notions, that might ſatisfie, but alſo to evince them Scriptural; for as much as otherwiſe, though they might be Philoſophical, and carry in them ſomething of conviction, yet not being Scriptural, they could not poſſibly be Chriſtian, and ſo anſwer my Ends.

In Fine, to be ingenuous with him, I was willing to annex the Teſtimonies of the Scriptures, and of Philoſophers together, to all or moſt of thoſe conſiderations I inſiſted on from Nature, or Reaſon, that I might inſinuate into the Atheiſt

theiſt a good belief of Scriptures; as, *that* there is ſome conformity in them with Nature, *that* they are repleniſh't with recondite wiſdome; and *that* that Religion comprehended in them is a piece of high Reaſon, and Philoſophy. And he cannot but believe all this, when he ſhall ſee before his eyes, ſo good a correſpondency and underſtanding between them.

As for the Philoſophers, I have quoted them at large, and in their own Terms, that I might not be ſuſpected to abuſe them, or my Reader; but yet have ſo conveniently diſpos'd the Texts, that thoſe, who liſt not to attend to them, as perhaps a many will not, that yet may have a mind to read the Reſt, they may ſkip and paſs them over, without any great trouble or interruption.

Onely one thing muſt be noted, that in ſome of theſe Citations I have made of the Philoſophers, it is the *Medium*, the Reaſon onely, which

which I urge them for; the *Application* being mine perhaps and not theirs; which yet I cannot reaſonably be arraigned for, ſeeing 'tis certain, that the Reaſon may be one and the ſame, when yet the matters wherein it is to hold are innumerous. And though I have *ſuppos'd* a God to be, and all things in the world to be made by Him, 'tis no more than what my Subject juſtifies; and yet by way of Obviation to the Atheiſts Cavils, I have occaſionally prov'd it, towards the end of this Diſcourſe; and therefore, if in Reading any part of it, a ſuch exception do ariſe, I muſt oblige the Reader to ſuſpend his thoughts a little, till it be remov'd.

I intended not to give my Reader any further trouble here, but on ſecond thoughts, I crave his pardon if I do, becauſe it looks to ſome, as if there were an irrepairable defect in the following Diſcourſe,

courſe in one Point, in as much as I have quoted no Philoſophers about it (and it is believ'd I cannot;) not having given any *intimations* of the knowledge of a Saviour [the greateſt inſtance of Divine Benignity] and of the method of ſalvation by him, among the *Gentiles*. And indeed I purpoſely declin'd the doing *that*, becauſe it is a point that will oblige me to a large Diſcourſe another where; but yet for preſent ſatisfaction, if I ſhould ſay there were among the Heathen, ſome darker intimations of that great Truth, for which we Chriſtians are beholden to the Evangel, though I might be judged very Paradoxical therein, yet I conceive, I ſhould affirm nothing, but what I had authority enough to verifie.

It cannot be denied, but that the Ancient Heathens underſtood that God was unattoneable, but by humane blood; the *Canaanites* did offer up their Children unto

MOLOCH [*Deut.* 18. 10.] and conformably the *Carthaginians*, who were a Colony of *Canaanites*, did yearly offer ſome of theirs to *Saturn*. Among the *Lacedemonians*, the Altar of *Diana Orthia* was beſprinkled once a year, with humane blood; two Perſons being Annually elected by the Lot for Sacrifice. Which uſage, as it was highly barbarous and cruel, is affirmed to be changed by the great *Lycurgus* for a milder; he ordaining, that the perſons on whom the Lot did fall, inſtead of being killed, ſhould be whipped, till the blood did flow. And with that, they did beſprinkle the Altar.

Plat. in Politic.

Vid. & Stuckium de ſacr. & ſacrif.

Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. c. 5. Num. 34. 35.

Pauſan. in Lacon.

This is much, but there is more. For ſome of them did underſtand, (if yet they underſtood what their Performances implyed) not onely that the great God was not to be propitiated and attoned but by humane blood; but alſo, that that bloud muſt be the blood of One that was *to take upon him* (as it

it were) *the Perſons and the guilt* of all, or of an *One* that by his ſufferings was to purge and cleanſe the reſt that offer'd him.

And this is evident, in that the old *Athenians* every year in (their) *Thargelion*, did ſacrifice a Man and a Woman, for the Men and Women of their City, to Expiate and Luſtrate them; and thoſe whom they did ſacrifice, they called* *Pharmaci*, as who would ſay, that thoſe were perſons, who, by being ſacrificed and offer'd up unto the Gods, were proper *Medicines* to purge and cleanſe thoſe others (from their ſins) that offer'd them. *Nic. Leonic. Thom. de varia hiſt. lib. 3. cap. 33.*

* So the Author, but better *Pharmaca.*

And it will be yet more manifeſt, if we conſider what *Leonicus Thomæus* further tells us out of *Lycophron*, that in the *moſt antient* times, if on any City there fell a Judgement of Famine, or Plague, or Sword, or other great Calamity, they were wont to take the *vileſt*, and moſt vitious perſon in it, whom *De var. hiſt lib. 3. c. 105.*

they called a * *Catharmus*, or a *Pharmacus*, and him they carried to the place of ſacrifice; and having there performed ſeveral Ceremonies, at laſt they burned him, and threw his aſhes into the Sea, and ſo appeaſed the Gods. It is not to be doubted, but that ſomething *Figurative* and *Myſtical* did lie in this; for otherwiſe they knew, what by the Light of Nature is remarkable to All, that to the Beſt, the Beſt was to be offer'd: And indeed the uſage ſeemeth but a Depravation of the Grand Tradition of the *Seed of the Woman*, and of *that* Propitiation and Attonement to be made to God for Sin by the offering up the Man Chriſt which was the ground of all Propitiatory Sacrifices

*Or rather *Catharma* and *Pharmacon.*

'Tis not improbable, but *Caiaphas*, of whom the Holy Ghoſt doth witneſs, that he propheſied and wiſt it not, that is, that he ſpoke righter than he was aware of ailuded hereunto, in ſaying it wa

nece

neceſſary one ſhould die for the People, he meaning (it is likely) that it was very fit, that one [intending Jeſus Chriſt] ſhould be made a kind of *Pharmacus* or *Catharmus*, and ſo be offer'd as a Victim for the People, to ſettle its Tranquility and Peace.

And indeed *Jeſus Chriſt* he is the true *Pharmacum* and *Catharma* for the whole World; it is he that taking on him the iniquities of us all, did make his Soul an offering for Sin, *by whoſe Stripes we are healed*, and of him it is that our Apoſtle ſaith (and perhaps alluding to the Grecian Luſtrations, as well as to the Jewiſh Purgations) That he did ——

—— Δι' ἑαυτοῦ ΚΑΘΑΡΙΣΜΟΝ ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν.

that he did by himſelf purge our Sins; or which is æquivalent, that in his own perſon, he was our true *Catharma*.

I might alſo argue their imperfect knowledge of a Saviour, from

the many Appellations which I find among them of their *Jupiter*, as *Jupiter Melichius*, *Jupiter Eleutherius*, *Jupiter Servator*, &c. And also take a hint to shew from whence they had it, namely from the Old and First Believers, from whom they took this usage to denominate their *Jupiter*, as these were wont to do their *El*, or *Jehovah*, from occasional occurrents, as *El Roi*, *Jehovah-Nissi*, &c. I say, they seem to have receiv'd these intimations of the true Religion, not so much from the *Jews*, whom generally all the *Gentiles* hated; of whom they make but little mention in their Writings, and with whom they did not care to converse, as by the Catholick *Tradition* of the world, from the First and most Ancient Ages, and Patriarchs. So *Plato* who is express.

Platon. Politic. —— Ἀπεμνημονεύετο δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων τῶν πρώτων, οἱ τελευτώσημεν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιφορᾷ τὴν ἑξῆς χρόνον ἐγείτονοιν, τῆς δὲ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐφεύοντο.

Τῦ-

Τῶτων γὰρ ὅτοι κήρυκες ἐγένονθ' ἡμῖν τῶν λόγων, οἳ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὐκ ορθῶς ἀπιστῶνται.——

Again.

—— Καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ, κρείττονες ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν—— *Id. in Philebo.*

Again.

—— Ἃ κατιδόντες μὲν πρόσθεν, παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις—— *Ibid.*

But to return, there is one Authority more that I ſhall urge, and that is *Plato's*, who ſeemeth to have pointed his Diſciples to our Saviour, for who elſe can he be thought to mean, when he telleth them they ſhould adhere unto his *Dogmata*, but *till another Perſon*, a Divine One came, who would inſtruct them in the Truths themſelves, and him they were obliged to hear.

I confeſs, I never met with this paſſage in the workes of *Plato* my ſelf (and yet he ſeemeth in his Politicks to hint ſomething of an

ἱκανὸς μηνυτὴς a fit Meſſenger, one that ſhould reveal things) but in an Author, who it is to be preſumed, had it in the Schools of *Plato*, in him I have; and that is *Æneas Gazæus*, who introduceth *Theophraſtus* (one of the Perſons in a Dialogue, which he intitles ſo) aſſenting to *Axitheus*, the other, in theſe terms.

— *Agnoſco quod dicis optime: Nam &* Platoni *ipſi placuit, ut ſuis decretis eatenus ſtaretur, dum aliquis divinior homo in terris appareret, qui veritatem ipſam aperiat, cui conveniens ſit omnes aſſentiri, atque obtemperare.*

There is one thing more I muſt intreat the Reader not to be offended with, and that is, that I here annex ſome farther Teſtimonies of Philoſophers, which might indeed have more conveniently been added in their proper places, in the Body of the Diſcourſe it ſelf: but that the Copy being out of my hands, I was not capable of doing that: and yet I was unwilling to omit

omit them, they ſeeming unto me ſo full of evidence and clearneſs, and ſo apt to bring a great addition of light, to what I have already offer'd from others.

I have ſaid in my Diſcourſe, that God is therefore *Liberal*, Bountiful, and Beneficent, becauſe he is moſt *Perfect*, and is the Beſt Being, and I am here to ſay, it is no more than what is intimated to us by *Maximus Tyrius*.

—— Τὸ θεῖον πάντως πη τίθεσαι τελεώτατον καὶ αὐταρχεστατων· καὶ ἰσχυρότατον· ὡς εἴτι ἀφέλης, λυμανεῖς τῷ ὅλῳ. Ἐι γὰρ μὴ τέλεον, οὐκ αὔταρκες εἰδὲ οὐκ αὔταρκες, οὔπω τέλεων. Ἐιδὲ αὔταρκες, μηδὲ τέλεων, πῶς ἰσχυρόν, αὔταρκες δὲ ὂν καὶ τέλειον, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν, κατὰ μὲν τὴν τελειότητα, τὰ ἀγαθὰ βούλεται. κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν, ἔχει· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἰσχὺν, δύναται βουλόμενος δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔχων καὶ δυνάμενος, κατὰ τί μὴ δῷ;

Max. Tyr. Diſſert. 22.

Again, for as much as I have ſaid that the Heathen underſtood ſomewhat of the *State of Happineſs*, wherein Divine Bounty did at firſt eſtabliſh

Plato in Politic.

eſtabliſh man, it is no other than what *Plato* meaneth, when in his Politicks he treateth of the *Golden* Revolution under *Saturn*. For he declareth *that* to be a time, when God did rule, when Men were naked, and when the Earth afforded all things unto Men without labour; that in it Men had a vaſt and comprehenſive knowledg of the nature of things, that they did confer, and talk with the Beaſts, and that *theſe* were tame and friendly unto one another, and that all were ſubject to man. Who ſeeth not in this Tradition how agreable it is unto that of *Moſes*.

But *Hierocles*, (beſides what I have cited out of him, about the State of Pre-exiſtence, which I have evinced to be this of Innocence) doth in his Definition of Philoſophy, egregiouſly inſinuate, that Man in former time, was in another Condition, infinitely more Agreable and Happy than

than his present, and that then He was in Gods Image. For the *Definition* that he gives us of Philosophy, is to this purpose, that it is a *Restitution* of a man unto his proper state of Happiness, that of which he was possessed heretofore, and withal a re-conforming of him to the image of God. You shall have his own termes,

Φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ ζωῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κάθαρσις, καὶ τελειότης. Κάθαρσις μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀλογίας, καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ σώματος· τελειότης δὲ, τῆς οἰκείας εὐζωΐας ΑΝΑΛΗΨΙΣ, πρὸς τὴν ΘΕΙΑΝ ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΝ ΕΠΑΝΑΓΟΥΕΑ.

Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag. p. in princip.

As for the *Impotency of the* Humane Will, and the cause thereof, that Notion of it I have offer'd in the Treatise, is the very same with what *Max. Tyrius* doth alledge as his.

——Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ὄλισθος, αὐτοφυοῦς ἀσθενείας ἔργον· ἢ καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς ψυχὰς κολακεύουσα διὰ ἡδονῶν καὶ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΗΜΑΤΩΝ εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁδοὺς ταῖς μοχθηρίαις συγκαθέλκει——

Max Tyr. dissert. 22.

And

And what I ſaid of *Grace*, or of Divine Aſſiſtance, how abſolutely neceſſary 'tis, that we may do good, is but what the Author laſt mention'd, doth alſo ſay.

——Αἱ γὰρ ἄνευ ψυχῆς φύσεις, ἀμφισβητήσιμοι ἐν μετρίῳ τῆς ἀνευ ἀρετῆς, πρὸς τὸ ἐλάττω μοχθηρίαν κεκτῆσθαι δέονται ξυναγωνιστῆ θεῦ καὶ ξυλλήπτορος τῆς ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ κρείττω ῥοπῆς καὶ χειραγωγίας ——.

I had almoſt forgotten one paſſage in *Plato*, about a *Future Judgment*, which added unto that of *Plutarch*, I have cited in the following Treatiſe, will render the belief of that Article moſt Rational. And it is ſo full and clear a teſtimony of it, and ſo particular, that that account thereof in *Matthew*, hath not, in reſpect of its diſtinctneſs ſo great advantage of it, as in reſpect of its authority it has. For my part I am aſtoniſht at it: 'Tis in his Diſcourſe De *Rep.*

Therein, he introduces *ERUS*, the Pamphilian, Son of one *Armenius*

nius; a Person slain in Battle, and fabled to have risen again, the twelfth day after, as they were laying him upon the (Funeral) Pile. Him he introduces reporting to the Inhabitants of the present World, the Observations he had made in the other; which he was commanded to recount, at his return to this, and he brings him in speaking thus.

Ἔφη δε] ἐπειδὴ ὃ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιαν, ἐν ᾧ τῆς γε γῆς δύο εἶναι χάσματα ἐχωμένω ἀλλήλοιν, καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρύ. Δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι· οἷς ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς ΔΕΞΙΑΝ. τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους, τὴν εἰς ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑΝ τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν ——

In fine the Method I have taken in evincing the Benignity of God, from the instances thereof, that are in things, is the very same that *Socrates*,

crates, *Plato*, *Cicero*, (Authors worthy to be read in all Languages) and others of the Antients uſed to eſtabliſh Providence. *Galen's* laudatory Hymn in honour of the Great Creatour, is admirable, and verily the ableſt Chriſtians that have gone the ſame way as *Lactantius* did of old, and as *Leſſius*, *Morney*, and ſome others do of late, have not got a foot beyond them. It was therefore I but hinted things on that head, becauſe I would oblige my Reader to conſult with theſe.

Plat. de legib. lib. 10. Id in Epinom. Xenoph. de fact & dict. Socrat. lib. 1. Cicer de nat. Deor. lib. 2.

I had many other things to add, but I fear, I have already ſurfeited the Reader, And I know it is not fit the Gates ſhould be too wide; onely I will tell him, I have offer'd more Reaſons, why the Great God defers the puniſhment of the wicked, and bears with them ſo long, becauſe my ſubject did not fairly lead me to it; I conſidering that Patience, Long-ſuffering, and forbearance of Almighty God, as

a great example and inſtance of his Goodneſs, and no objection againſt it. And ſo did the Apoſtle, who puts them together. *Or deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his Goodneſs, and Forbearance, and Long ſuffering, not knowing that the Goodneſs of God leadeth thee to Repentance.*

But thoſe who will not be content with this account thereof, may be pleaſed to converſe a while with *Plutarch*, who having undertaken in a Treatiſe made on purpoſe, to ſolve this common appearance, hath quit himſelf as excellently in it, as he doth in all things elſe he undertakes. He ſhews it is, *that* God might be an Example of the Goodneſs he would have us imitate; *that* the wicked might have time to repent; that though he doth defer their puniſhment, he doth not pardon 'm? 'Tis that the Wicked may be inſtruments to puniſh others, and for many other Reaſons, which he mentions there.

And now I'le caſt my ſelf upon the

Apul Florid. lib. the Readers ingenuity and candor, when I have once confessed freely to him, that I have nothing else to offer in excuse for this unusual trespass on his patience, but that of *Apuleius*. — *Nec quidquam omnium est quod possit in primordio sui perfici: sed in omnibus ferme ante est spei rudimentum quam rei experimentum.*

Corrigenda.

P*Ag* 2 *line* 13 *read* desirable. *l.* 14 *after him ad*]. *l.* 26 *r.* μέζον. *p.* 12 *l.* 24 *r.* וּמֵטִיב טוֹב. *l.* 29 *r.* on. *p* 13 *l* 4 *r.* on. *p* 15 *l.* 3 *r.* ἀσώματον. *l* 3 καθὰ. *l.* 28 *r.* agnoscito. *p* 16 *l.* 22 *r.* opus suum. *p.* 19 *l.* 5 *r.* exhibentur. *l.* 11 *r.* interpretes *l* 21 *r.* Velleius. *l.* 26 *r.* exhibere. *p.* 20 *l* 11 *r.* beata. *p* 23 *l.* 20 *dele* the *r.* his. *p.* 31 *l.* 15 *r.* recta. *p.* 34 *l* 26 *for* τοῦτο *r.* τοῦτο. *p.* 35 *l.* 2. *r.* τουτε *p* 61 *l.* 4 *r.* ἄνεισι δὲ. *l.* 12 ὁρμῇ. *p.* 103 *l.* 15. *r.* τέ. *p.* 105 *l.* 15 נשמה *p.* 106 *l.* 23 *r.* connectens. *p.* 113 *l* 13 *r.* εἰσήγαγεν. *p.* 121 *l.* 12 *r.* ascend. *p* 131 *l.* 7 *for* had *r.* have.

DIVINE

DIVINE GOODNESSE

Explicated and Asserted.

CHAP. I.

Goodneſs an Eſſential Notion of God. The Definition of it. Divine Perfection or Allſufficiency what. That it is the fundamental Reaſon of Divine Goodneſs. An impreſſion of it on the Creature. Divine Goodneſs demonſtrated out of Metaphyſics, and out of Nature, by Inſtances and Harmony.

SECT. I.

THE *Goodneſs* of the great God, or rather his *Optimity*, and beſtneſs, is ſo illuſtrious and acknowledg'd an Attribute of his, that the very *Heathen* knew him, and ador'd him by it: Their *Jupiter* was *Optimus* as well as *Maximus*. And it

is a Notion ſo inherent unto that of God, and ſo inſeparable from it, that you deſtroy the Godhead, if you but abſtract Goodneſs; not to make him Good, is to make him no God. It is the Devil is the evil one; God is the Good. [*He is Good, and doth Good.*

This *Optimity* or tranſcendent Goodneſs of the great God, is *nothing but that infinite Perfection, whereby he eminently in himſelf involveth all Good, and conſequently, whereby (ſeeing all deſirable, amiable, excellent, and lovely things are centred, and comprehended in him,) he is moſt lovely, all lovely, and all deſireable.* He is the univerſal Good, in whom the univerſal love, and univerſal deſire, the deſires of all things, and the loves of all, do all *concentrate.* And (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) what all doth deſire, is *ſimply* good; ſo none is good but God. He is *univerſally*, others but *particularly* good. This is *Ariſtotle's* τ' ἀγαθὸν

Ariſt. de mo ib. l. 1. c. 1. —— διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο, τἀγαθὸν, ὃ πάντα ἐφίεται.

Id. c. 5. —— ἀγαθὸν ὃ τὸ μᾶλλον, αἱρετώτερον ἀεί.

Now it is the infinite *Perfection* or *Sufficiency* of God, in reſpect of *which* the

the celebrated *Aristotle* calls him Αυταρκέσαιον, and which is signified in the Holy Scriptures by the name **El Shaddai**, a name by which he is remarkable, not only to the *Jewes*, but also to the *Greeks* and *Latines*, for as much as שַׁד (from which his Title **Shaddai** probably deriveth) doth seem to be the *Origen* of the Genitive Διὸς, of the Dative Διΐ, and of the Accusative Δία, from the Nominative Ζεὺς, and not unlikely the Latine *Deus*, and the phrase *sub Dio* (as a learned Critic wittily conjectures) cometh from it. I say this absolute Perfection [or *infinite concurrency of all things excellent, and Good, and lovely in God, whereby he being absolutely perfect and accomplished in all kindes, as standing on the Top of all, doth defect and want in nothing, which is good in any*;] It is the *ground* of his Optimity, or *Universal Convenience, and Desireableness*. For he therefore is most agreeable and good to all, and consequently most Desireable, because he *is All*; he is the παντλήρωμα, that *Universal, First, Original, and Fountain-Fulness*, that repleniſheth the whole Creation, which without him

would be all but empty Cask, and meer vacuity. All the Creatures, their *Springs are in God*, they are but *Cisterns* with him, and without him, empty *Caskes*. God is παὐπλήρωμα, the the *Plenitude* of all things, and it is his *Plenitude that botomneth his Goodness*. So *Aristotle*,

——τὸ δ' ἄειδον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. Again;
—— τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν, αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν, οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι, καὶ τέκνοις, &c.

And, God, he hath enough for himself, and all things else, *My Grace is sufficient for thee.*

There is an evident *impression* on the *world*, of this Alsufficiency and Αὐταρκέα of God; the World is an *Universe*, there are in it all imaginable *Sorts* of Being and all imaginable Furniture, Provisions, and Accomodations for them; *Porus* marries *Penia*; there are Remedies for all Distempers; agreeable supplies for all Occasions and Necessities; there is nothing *wanting*, no more than is Redundant in Nature. *The Earth is the Lords, and the fulness* [the fulness] *thereof.* Philosophers call the world τὸ ὅλον, *Universum.*

Vide Plutar de Placit. Philosph. l 1. c. 5.

SECT.

Sect. 2.

Now, having shewed what Optimity, or Transcendent goodness is, wherein it *formally* consists, as well as what *Foundation*, and what ground it has; it now remaineth, that I do evince it competent to God. which I shall Essay to do, (but very briefly) both from the *Metaphysics*, and from *Nature* it self.

And there are many *Topics* in the *Metaphysics*, which do evidently argue and evince him *so* Good; I shall insist on one, That as *there is a first Being, so there is a first Good*; there is a First in every Kind, a First *in genere bonorum*, as there is *in genere entium*; for as much as every thing is either First, or from it. And if there be a Primitive and First Good, which all inferiour ones derive from, and do participate (as, if there be a First, they must) It is the First Being, and consequently it is *God*, *which is it.* Good and Being are convertible; and therefore the First Being is the First Good. God is the First Being. All Second Beings are derived from the

First

Firſt Being: All Second and inferiour Good *participates* the Firſt Good.

And for *Phyſics*. The Divine Optimity or Tranſcendent Goodneſs is ſo *remarkably impreſſed on the whole Univerſe*, that *Moſes* that excellent Origeniſt, introducing God reveiwing it in its Creation, doth alſo introduce him thus commending it; *God ſaw every thing that he had made, and behold* [behold] *it was very good*, it was good, very good, מְאֹד טוֹב; and God ſaw it. It was very good in Gods eye, and therefore may be well ſo in Mans; and very Good it is,

For there is *Nothing in the whole world, but is good for ſomething*, if it be not ſo for one thing, it is ſo for another; and is either Good to profit, or to pleaſe; a Verity ſo great, that in the *Metaphyſics* Bonity and Entity are made convertible; [that cannot be at all, that is not good.] Onely, all inferiour is Diſperſed good, and Limited; ſo that what is eminently good in one kind, is very rarely ſo in another; that is ſeldome moſt uſeful, and of moſt advantage for either Medicine or Meat, which is moſt embelliſht and

and adorn'd. The creeping Worms, many of them, are more curiously set off, and clad more richly, than the noblest *Animals*. *Solomon* in all his Glory, was not half as brave, and as magnificent as a *Tulip*; and yet a *Tulip*, that is the most beautiful and the most fair, it is the least useful, and least medicinal of Flowers. What is most gaudy, is not most great, *God hath tempered the body together, giving more abundant honour to that which lacked it.* The Goodness shining in the world, is a *Wise* one, a well ordered Goodness.

But to return, it were endless to expatiate all the world over, and to instance in the Excellencies scattered in it, there is an admirable Majesty in *Man*, and in the *Heavens* a magnificence and grandeur, which surprizeth all that view them. How infinitely pleasant is the *Spring*! and in it, how gaudy is the *Earth*! and in how delicate pentadoes is it cloathed! All the *Seasons* have their proper goodness; the world can't subsist without them. There are in them, and as in them, in all things else, so infinite, and so agreeable *Varieties*, such Miracles of

Beauty, *Order*, and *Proportion* to entertain and feaſt the Atheiſt, that they cannot but convince him, if he once attend, that ſeeing there is ſo much excellency and goodneſs in the things made, there muſt needs be infinitely *more*, in him that made them.

SECT. 3.

Moreover, 'tis as eaſie to demonſtrate from the world, and from all *Appearances* therein, as 'tis to undertake it, *that* all *inferiour* is participated good; *that* ſeeing all participation is of ſome *Superiour*, there is not any Good below, but what is from One above, and doth deſcend; and *that* the great God, the Higheſt Being, is of neceſſity the *Beſt*.

For there are in the world many *Claſſes, Ranks, and Orders of Beings, and very comely diſpoſition of them, Secundum ſub & ſupra*, of one above another, but of all in ſuch Relation, that thoſe Perfections, which are ſcattered in the inferiour, are collected and amaſſed in the Superiour; and what are collected and amaſſed in the Superiour, are diſpers'd and ſcattered in the inferiour

riour. So that, as the lower any Being is, it, having the fewer perfections, is the leſs perfect and good; ſo the higher any is, it having more perfections, is the better, and conſequently the Higheſt Being is the beſt. God is *the Father of Lights from whom every good and perfect gift deſcendeth.* All aſcent upon the *ſcale* of Being, is by *Addition*; all deſcent, is by *Subſtraction*, and Participation. There is participated *intelligence* in Man; participated *Reaſon* in Beaſts; participated *Senſe* in Vegetables; participated *Life* in Naturals. Nature is in *Vegetables*, with vegetative Life; Nature and vegetative Life, with Senſe in *Senſitives*; Nature, vegetative Life, and Senſe, with Reaſon in *Rationals*; and no higher can we go upon the ſcale, in the viſible world. So well contrived and Harmonical the world is. Witneſs *Cicero.* De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.

——*Eſt enim admirabilis quædam continuatio, ſerieſque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa, & omnes inter ſe aptæ, colligatæque videantur.*

CHAP.

CHAP. II. Sect. 1.

Two conſequent Notions from that of God's Goodneſs, Beneficence, and Finality. Divine Beneficence defined, and demonſtrated from Divine Bonity, and Supremacy, and in Providence. Teſtimonies of Providence from Pythagoras, Socrates, Ariſtotle, Cicero, &c. *What* Epicurus *and* Lucretius *thought of it.*

SO much for Divine Goodneſs or Optimity, conſider'd abſolutely in it ſelf; but for its *Of-Spring*; there are other Attibutes reſulting from it, two of which I ſhall conſider, *viz.* The Infinite *Beneficence* or Benignity of God, and then his abſolute *Finality*; that he is good to all, as well as in himſelf, and is the End of all.

Divine Beneficence, (wherein I comprehend the *Love*, and *Kindneſs*, the *Mercy*, *Grace*, *Benignity*, and *Bounty* of God) is *that infinite Diffuſiveneſs of Nature, whereby he is moſt ready to Communicate, and to impart the Good is in him.* A perfection ſo *Eſſential* to him

him, that he could not be a God, becauſe not *Good*, without it; it being this communicativeneſs, this propenſity of Nature to impart, that in the common Senſe and Language of the whole World, doth eminently entitle and denominate one *ſo*. For He in *common Language* is denominated a Good, who is a Liberal, a Loving, a Kind, a Merciful, an Appeaſable, and Bountiful Man; as alſo in the ſacred *Scriptures*, *For a good Man one will even dare to die*; and for a Good, is for a Bountiful, Benign, Merciful, Ingageing Man: One that hath obliged him by courteſies, and is his Benefactor, for ſuch an one another may dare it.

And ſuch an One is God; his Name of Alſufficiency implies it, for **El Shaddai**, or his Name of Alſufficiency is compoſed of דַי which ſignifies Sufficience. and of the relative שׁ, as who would ſay, Divine Sufficiency is *Relative*: the דַי of God *is* שׁדַי; and it is imported in that raviſhing expreſſion, *My Grace is ſufficient for thee*. For were not this implyed in it, that what ſufficiency ſoever is in God, is in him *for the Creature*, to aſſiſt and help it, what *Vide* Ariſt. *ubi ſupra.*

what consolation could it minister? or what incouragement? 'Tis onely relative Sufficiency that is a consolation or incouragement, an absolute one is none. For God to say he has enough, but not to give it, were to *tantalize*. But God's Sufficiency is relative, he is very liberal, and open handed, and he cannot possibly be otherwise, because he is so good.

For all Good, *it is communicative and Diffusive, and by how much more good a Being is* (if that inelegance be tolerable) *by so much more Diffusive* (as Philosophers assure us) and more communicative 'tis: so that God in being most good τ' ἀγαθὸν, the absolutely best, is also most Diffusive and Beneficent. It is a Scriptural connection, that *God is good and doth good*; that is, He is in proportion as propense to be communicative, and imparting as he is good; he is good and doth good, טוֹב וּמֵטִיב. As is the Man so is his strength, God is abundant in goodness. He is the Original, Fountain, and First Good; and so hath all Good for others, as well as in himself.

And the world shews it, for as on Por-

Porphyrie's *Tree the higher grades* are the commoner, and more extensive too they be, and the highest are the most so; *so on the scale of Being*, the lower and inferiour, which are more immers'd in matter, are the more determin'd and contracted, but the higher and Superiour, which are more immersed and spiritual, are more diffusive and free. All Confinement is from Earth and Matter, but 't is form and Spirit, that is the *Root* of all inlargement and freeness. Minerals are absolutely determin'd; Vegetables, less; Animals, spontaneous; Rationals, arbitrary. Thus also in Mechanic *Spirits*, the subtiler they are, the more spreading. And *Light* of all Corporeal Beings, the most refin'd and pure, is also most imparting and diffusive.

Now God, *He is an absolute pure and spiritual Act*, inhabiting in Light as inaccessable as glorious, and therefore, seeing he Presideth on the Top of all Being, he cannot but be infinitely Free, and so much more, more imparting and communicative than is any other, as he is purer and more high than it. For sayes our Saviour, *If ye then being*

Evil,

Evil, *know how to give good gifts to your Children*, how much more *shall your Father which is* in Heaven, *give good things to them which ask him.* Evil is oppos'd to *Heavenly*, if ye being Evil. &c. How much more shall your Father, which is in Heaven, &c. To be earthly is to be evil, narrow, and illiberal. But what is pure Heavenly and High, is free and noble. God is the most *High*, and therefore most communicative.

But to give the Atheist *Instances*, as well as other Proofs and Demonstrations of Divine Beneficence. It *is Illustriously exemplified in his Providence*; which is so visible in all the world, that it is acknowledged by all Philosophers (not to mention Poets, *Orpheus*, &c.) and particularly,

By *Pythagoras* of whom *Iamblicus*.

—— μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐμάνθανε παρ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοθεν ἠρτῆσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖσθαι πάντα, ἀπ' ἄλλων τε πλειόνων, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῶν ἱερῶν.

By *Socrates* of whom * *Xenophon*.

—*Horum itaque omnium, si qui sunt qui* nil a divina providentia *putent, sed a nostro arbitrio omnia pendêre, hos* insanire *asserebat.*

Iambl. de vit. Pythag. c. 32.

* *Xenoph. de fact. et dict. Socrat. l. 1.*

Bessarione interprete. Vid. Socrat. orat. apud Indic. in Cicer. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1.

By

By *Aristotle*, (but somewhat uncertainly) of whom *Diogenes Laertius*. Diog. Laer. de vit. l. 5

— Τὸν δὲ θεὸν ἀσώματον ἀπέφαινε Καθὰ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων, διατείνει δὲ αὐτοῦ, τὴν πρόνοιαν μέχρι τῶν οὐρανίων, καὶ εἶναι ἀκίνητον αὐτόν· τὰ δὲ ἐπίγεια, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμπάθειαν οἰκονομεῖσθαι.

And *Velleius* in *Cicero*. Cic. de nat. Deor lib. 1.

— Aristoteles *quoq; in tertio de philosophia libro, multa* turbat, *a Magistro* Platone *uno dissentiens : modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem : modo mundum ipsum Deum dicit esse : modo quendam alium præficit mundo : eique eas partes tribuit, ut replicatione mundi quadam motum regat, atque tueatur, &c.*

By *Cicero*

— *Hæc igitur, & alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his* præsit *aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut* Platoni *videtur : vel si semper fuerint, ut* Aristoteli *placet,* moderator *tanti operis & muneris? sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides; tamen, ut* Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, *sic ex memoria rerum & inventione, & celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscitor.* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1.

Again

—de nat Deor. lib. 2.

Again,

—*Quid vero tanta rerum consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio? quem non coget ea, quæ a me dicuntur comprobare.*

Ibid. *Dico igitur* providentia *deorum mundum, & omnes mundi partes & initio constitutas esse, & omni tempore administrari: &c.*

Senec. de pro id. c. 1.

By *Seneca.*

Quæsisti a me, Lucili, *quid ita si providentia mundus ageretur, multa bonis viris acciderent mala. Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur, cum* præesse universis providentiam *probaremus, & interesse nobis Deum, &c.*

—natural. Quæst. l. 1.

Again.

—*Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, & quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest. Si solus est omnia, opus & extra & intra* tenet, *&c.*

Ibid.

Again.

—*Nec hæc intra vulgum* dementia *est, sed sapientiam quoque professos contigit. Sunt qui putent, sibi ipsis animum esse, & quidem providum ac dispensantem singula, & sua, & aliena, hoc autem*

autem universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, & aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut natura nescient e quid faciat.

By *Arrianus.* *Arrian. Epict. de provid. cap. 6. lib. 1.*

Ἀφ' ἑκάστου τῶν κόσμῳ γινομένων, ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, &c.

By *Hierocles.* *Hier. in Carm. Pythag.*

— εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἑκάστῳ ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν ἀξίαν τὴν νῦν λεγομένην ΜΟΙΡΑΝ, ἠρτημένην τῆς τῆς προνοίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς εὐταξίας, καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προαιρέσεως. εἰ μὴ γὰρ εἴη Θεοῦ πρόνοια, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τάξις ἐν κόσμῳ, ἢν καὶ εἱμαρμένην ἂν εἴποιτις.

By *Chrysippus* in *Plutarch*, who makes it of a large extent. *Plutarch. de Stoic. contrar. Jano Carnario interpr.*

— *Horum neq; minimum, neque maximum, præter Jovis rationem & legem, & justitiam, ac providentiam esse* Chrysippus putat.

By *Plato* and *Plutarch* in innumerable places.

By *Apuleius.* *Apul. de mundo.*

— *Mundus est ornata ordinatio, Dei munere; Deorum* recta custodia, *&c.*

Again, *Ibid.*

— *Restat, quod caput est sermonis*

hujus, ut ſuper mundi rectore *verba faciamus. Indigens quippe videbitur oratio de Mundo diſputantibus, ut etſi minus curioſe, at quomodo poſſumus, diſſeramus. De* rectore *quippe omnium non, ut ait ille, ſilere melius eſt: ſed vel parum dicere.* Vetus opinio eſt, *atq;* cogitationes omnium hominum penitus inſedit, Deum *eſſentiæ originis haberi auctorem, Deumq; ipſum ſalutem eſſe, & perſeverantiam earum quas effecerit, rerum. Neq; ulla res eſt tam præſtantibus viribus quæ viduata Dei auxilio, ſui natura contenta ſit. Hanc opinionem* Vates *ſecuti, profiteri auſi ſunt,* omnia Jove plena eſſe; *cujus præſentiam non jam cogitatio ſola, ſed oculi & aures, & ſenſibilis ſubſtantia comprehendit, &c.*

Again,

Ibid. — *Poſtremò quod eſt in triremi* gubernator, *in curru* rector, præcentor *in choris,* Lex *in urbe,* dux *in exercitu; hoc eſt in Mundo* Deus: *niſi quod,* &c.

Again,

Again.

—*Unde ſuſceptam providentiam Dii ſecundæ providentiæ ita graviter retinent; ut omnia etiam quæ cœlitus mortalibus exhibentur, immutabilem* ordinationis paternæ *ſtatum teneant. Dæmones vero, quos Genios & Lareis poſſumus nuncupare, miniſtros Deorum arbitratur, cuſtodeſq; hominum & interpretes, ſi quid a Diis velint. Nec ſane omnia referenda ad vim Fati putat: ſed eſſe aliquid in nobis, & in Fortuna nonnihil, & Fortunæ quidem improvidos caſus ignorari a nobis fatetur, &c.* Apul. de dogm. Platonis.

In ſum by *all* others, who acknowledg'd a Divinity (but in a very different way) excepting only *Epicurus*,

[Of whom *Velleius* in *Cicero*.

—*Quod ſi ita eſt, vere expoſita illa ſententia eſt ab* Epicuro, *QUOD æternum beatumque ſit, id nec habere ipſum negotii quidquam, nec exhibere alteri. Itaq; neq; ira, neq; gratia teneri, quod, quæ talia eſſent,* Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 1.

imbecilla eſſent omnia. Si nihil aliud quæreremus, niſi ut deos pie coleremus, & ut ſuperſtitione liberaremur, ſatis erat dictum, nam & præſtans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum & æterna eſſet & beatiſſima. HABET enim venerationem juſtam quidquid excellit: & metus omnis a vi, atq; ira deorum pulſus eſſet. Intelligitur enim a beata immortalique natura & iram & gratiam ſegregari: quibus remotis, nullos a ſuperis impendere metus, &c.]

and a few forlorn Ones that follow him; among which *Lucretius* that notorious Athieſt, who maketh Providence a Fiction, and a meer effect of Fear and Superſtition, is the Leader or Chief.

Quippe ita formido *mortaleis continet omneis.*

Quod multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur:

Quorum operum cauſas nulla ratione videre.

Poſſunt, ac fieri divino numine *rentur*

SECT.

Sect. 2.

Providence deſcrib'd, and ſpecifi'd. (1.) 'Tis General, Particular, Special, moſt Special. The great evincement of it, that all things are order'd for the beſt (1.) In the Natural World! This ſhew'd by many Inſtances in Nature.

Now *Providence* it ſelf, whereof the *Stoicks* were ſo great Aſſertors, that it is called by *Velleius. Stoicorum πρόνοια*, is *Nothing but the Fatherly and prudent care of God, in ordering of the Univerſe.* To comprehend which, whoever hath a Family of his own, or knowes what it is to have one, and what to Govern it, he need but to conſider that the World is God's. The World is a great Houſe, and God is Maſter in it. He is that great *Father, of whom all the Family in Heaven and Earth is named*; and his Providence, is but his ordering and diſpoſing, his

Cicer. de nat. deor. lib. 1.

Apul. de dogm. Platon ubi ſupra.

Plutarch. de Fato.

Plutarch. Sympoſiac. lib. 8. quæſt. 1.

Looking (as we call it) to his Family, and his caring and providing for it. Providence is πρόνοια.

Senec. de Provid. c. 1. And this his Providence, as it is *general and comprehensive, extending over all the kinds*, so it also is *particular, and reacheth every individual*, and numerical thing in every kind; for, as *he preserveth Man and Beast* in general, so a *Sparow* in particular, *falleth not without our heavenly Father*. And indeed it is no more *beneath* the divine Majesty, to provide and care for all, than it was to form all, and make them. *Cicero* is plain 'tis so in Men.

Chrysip in Plutarch. Apul de mundo. Senec. nat. quæst. vid. omnes ubi supra.

Cicer. de nat deor. lib. 2. — *Quæ si singula vos fortè non movent, universa certè inter se connexa, atq; conjuncta movere debebunt. Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam* singulis *a diis immortalibus consuli, & provideri solet, &c.*

But it is more *distinguishing and special over Mankind, than over others*, and so eminently so, that in comparison thereof, whatever providence

vidence he hath for other *Species.* (that are lower) is eſteemed none. *Doth God take care for Oxen?* yes, but not *comparatively*; God eminently cares for men. Hear *Ciccro*,

——*Nam cum* ceteras *animantes abjeciſſet ad paſtum*, ſolum hominem *erexit, ad cœliq; quaſi cognationis domiciliiq; priſtini conſpectum excitavit: &c.* Cic. de legib. Hb 1.

But it is *moſt diſtinguiſhing* and *ſpecial over pious and religious Men*, or thoſe that fear him, *He is the Saviour of all Men*, but eſpecially, *of thoſe that believe*; and there is Reaſon for it. For Pious and Religious, are *Divine* Men; they are the very Habitations, Houſes, and Temples of the great God, and ſo it is his ſpecial intereſt to look to theſe. *The Hairs of* their *Head are numbred.* So the Apoſtle,

——*Ye are the Temples of the Holy Ghoſt.*

——*Partakers of the Divine Nature.*

And ſo *Cicero*,

——*Quod autem ex hominum ge-* Cic. de legib lib 2.

nere conſecratos, *ſicut* Herculem, *& ceteros, coli lex jubet, indicàt* omnium *quidem animos immortales eſſe: ſed* fortium bonorumque divinos. *Bene verò, quod Mens, Pietas, Virtus, Fides, conſecratur manu: quarum omnium* Romæ *dedicata publicè templa ſunt, ut illa qui habeant* (habent autem omnes boni) *deos ipſos* in animis ſuis collocatos *putent. &c,*

Cic. de nat. deor. lib. 2. ——*NEMO igitur vir magnus ſine aliquo afflatu* divino *unquam fuit, &c.*

I intend not to expatiate now on this ſubject, but only to illuſtrate in it, the Goodneſs, and Beneficence of God: which, I ſuppoſe, I ſhall have done effectually, when I have proved, that all *things in the world, are contrived and order'd for the beſt; and all adminiſtrations in it ſo conducted.* All is for the beſt, both in the Natural and Moral World.

And verily, it were as eaſie to evince at large (if I had leaſure) that

that all things in the *Natural World* are *order'd and contrived for the beſt*, as to Eſſay to do it; In *the Magnetiſme* of the Earth; the *Atmoſphære* that fringes it: the *obliquity* of the *Zodiac*, and the motions of the *Sun* and *Moon* reſpectively therein. *The Alternations* of the Seaſons, of Day and Night, of Summer and Winter. The happy coaptation of the Sea and Land into one *Globe* and Center. *The Saltneſs* of the Sea; its perpetual *Æſtuation*, Flux and Reflux. *The* Elevation and Depreſſion of the Earth in *Hills* and *Valleys*. *The* Irrigation of it with *Rivers*. *Rain* from Heaven. *The freſhneſs* of the Rain, as well as of Rivers. *The Elaſticity* of the Air, or its ſpringineſs: its ventilation by *Winds*; *the* purgation of it by *Storms*, Lightnings, and Thunders. *The* commodities of *Navigation*. *The* admirable circumſtance of Providence, to render a *Torrid Zone* (beyond the Apprehenſion of the old Philoſophers,

Kircher. Magnet. l. 1 par. 2. Id in iiin. exſtat Vid. Cicer. de nat. deor. lib. 2. cum multis aliis.

phers, and School men) *habitable*. *The Breezes* and *Monſoons*. The *Diſtribution* of the Gifts of Nature, ſome to one Country, ſome to another, but of all to none.

And it where infinite to inſtance in the particulars (whereon ſome able perſons have very learnedly diſcourſed) of the *Fabrick* and Anatomy of Plants and Animals; the *Beauty* of the former; the *Inſtincts* of the latter; the *Propagation* of the kinds in both; the *Subordination* and Uſefulneſs of all; and in the plentiful *Proviſion* which is made for all; wherein the *Order* of the Houſe is admirable.

There *is an infinite increaſe of little Fiſhes*, on which the greater were to prey; and *in the Iſland of Fierro, a Tree* is ever dropping, which ſupplies the whole with water. *There are extraordinary dews in* Ægypt, where is no Rain; and *in* Peru, *where alſo is none, a Wind*

Herberts travels, lib. 1. L'Blancs travels, par. 3. c. . Sandys travels, l 2. &c.

Wind that fans and moiſtens. *The watring of* Ægypt *with the* Nile, is miraculous. The *flying Fiſhes perſecuted in the ſea by the* Dolphins, Boneta's, Albicores, *and* Sharkes, and ſo compell'd to uſe the ir finny wings, and take the Air to avoid them, afford a meal to hunger-bitten Birds, that look for them. And which is admirable and ſurprizing, the *young* Ravens, *when abandon'd and relinquiſht by their Old ones cry*, and crying gape, and gaping receive the *flies* that ſkiffing up and down the Air, (as if impuls'd to do ſo) direct their courſe into their mouths; and ſo they are fed. Thus the Royal Pſalmiſt, *He giveth to the Beaſts their food, and to the young* Ravens *which cry*, [which cry] the *Ravens* **cry**, and then, and thus he hears them. **Diſ**ſection proves it true; their *Ventricles* are full of Flies: the *Ravens* cry, and God hears, we muſt alwayes aſk, and ſometimes cry, if we will have.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

2. *In the Moral World, proved in the Law and Order of the Houſe. An Objection about the exiſtence of Evil anticipated, Pœnal and Afflictive Evils for mans Good. How things are beſt for the Beaſts. Evils as Entities, neceſſary for the plenitude of the World; as Afflictive for Gods Glory; and as Pœnal for Mans good. Things ought to be as they are. An Objection from the Apparent ill adminiſtration of things* [*Good to the Evil, Evil to the Good*] *propoſed,*

But in his *Adminiſtration* of the Government of the Moral World, (for ſo I call that of Mankind, in diſtinction to the Natural,) his Providence and Goodneſs, are as viſible as great; *in that all things in it are deſigned* for the *beſt*, and *ultimately iſſue in it*: He ruleth in his

his Houſe, in all things, as a wiſe and prudent Maſter, by aſſigning *to his Children and his Servants, their reſpective duties (in it) which are for the Good of all in general, and each of them in particular, as well as for his own Glory*; *and by* obliging *them unto them with Rewards, and Puniſhments.* Thus he *Diſciplines* and *Governes* them. Government is for the Good of Man, and all Government is from God: He holds the reins of all himſelf, and he preſcribes the Rules and Lawes of it.

I aſk the Atheiſt, *if it would not be a Golden and moſt happy Age, wherein* all men loved others as intirely and ſincerly as they do themſelvs: *wherein* together with their own concernments, and intereſts all equally reminded thoſe of others; *wherein* they univerſally abſtaining from all injuſtice and wrong, each aſſiſted other to the utmoſt; and *wherein* they lived and converſed each with other devoid of Envy, Malice;

Malice, Covetouſneſs, Pride, Contention, &c. And if he anſwer me *it would*; I tell him this is the *Order* of the Houſe, that Law of Nature, (*which is nothing elſe, but what the Practical and common Reaſon of man doth dictate to be done*) that God hath ſanction'd in the world, to which he hath obliged all his Servants to conform; thus he will have them do, and thus be; and that they may, he hath adapted *means* (the beſt imaginable) to ingage and move them to it: He diſciplines and acts them with *Rewards and Puniſhments:* He promiſeth them Good, if they obey, and threatens them with Evil, if they do not. So the Apoſtle,

— Do by Nature the things contained in the Law.

— Having not the Law, are a Law unto themſelves.

— Work of the Law written in their hearts, &c.

— Their thoughts accuſing, or excuſing one another. And

And so *Cicero.* *Cic. de leg. lib. 2.*

— *Nec, si regnante* Tarquinio nulla erat *Romæ* scripta Lex *de stupris, iccirco non contra* illam legem *sempiternam Sex.* Tarquinius *vim* Lucretiæ Tricipitini *filiæ attulit. Erat* enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens, & a delicto avocans: *quæ non tum deniq; incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est,* orta autem simul est cum mente divina, *quam ob rem lex vera atq; princeps,* apta ad *jubendum, & ad vetandum,* ratio est recta summi *Jovis,* &c.

— *Ergo est lex justorum, injustorumq;* distinctio, *ad illam* antiquissimam, *& rerum omnium principem expressa naturam, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quæ supplicio* improbos *afficiunt, & defendunt, & tuentur* bonos, *&c.* *Ibid.*

— *Sit igitur hoc jam a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos, eaq; quæ gerantur, eorum geri judicio, ac numine, eosdemq;* optime de *Ibid.*

genere

genere hominum *mereri*, & quali *quiſq; ſit*, quid *agat*, *quid in ſe admittat*, *qua mente*, *qua pietate religiones colat*, intueri, piorumq; & impiorum habere *rationem: his enim rebus imbutæ mentes*, *haud ſane abhorrebunt ab utili*, *& a vera ſententia: &c.*

There muſt be *Pœnal* and *Afflictive Evils that there may be Puniſhments*, as well as there are Goods: agreeable obliging things for Compenſations and Rewards; it being very often very good for the Child, though he think not ſo, that his Father take the *Rod* in hand; Croſſes, Loſſes, Pains, and ſiniſter incounters are but Rods in God's. Now the means are good if the end be ſo. *Finis dat mediis amabilitatem*, *bonitatem*, &c. It is good for Man, there are afflictive, pœnal Evils: His Vices are Diſtempers, and theſe are *Medicines* to cure them, and Wars themſelves, are Puniſhments to Nations, as Diſeaſes are to ſingle Perſons.

persons. No Government without Rewards and Punishments, no Rewards and Punishments without Good and Evil.

And if it be best for Man it is so for the *Beasts*, and other Animals, and other inferiour Beings; Man is the *End* and Lord of these, and therefore [these not having any interest of their own distinct, from his, because they are but his, and not their own] That is best for them, which is so for him. *The Accessory followes the Principal.* Now Man, he hath an interest in these and so is punishable in them; and is afflictable by these, and so is punishable by them. Wherefore, the Good and Evil, that is in them, the *poyson* and malignity in Minerals and Plants; the venom, enmity, and violence, the fury and *rapacity* in many Animals, as well as the commodity and usefulness of others; *Tempests* in the Air; Convulsions in the Earth; the Fiery Eruptions of *Ætna and Vesuvius*,

and other ſuch enormous, and irregular emotions of the Elements, as well as regular and orderly, are not in them for themſelves, but all for Man, Man is their end, as God is Mans. Let not the Atheiſt complain. God is very Good and Liberal to Man, who has ſo bountifully given all (theſe) things to him. Yea, and he is good to the Beaſts alſo, in that he hath oblidged man to be ſo to them.

But to be more diſtinct. If we reflect on all the things, are called *Evils*, and conſider them as *things*, and abſolutely in themſelves, ſo *they have a good of Entity or Being*, and are neceſſary to the Univerſe, that it may be *Uniform* full, and perfect. *In the day of Proſperity be joyful, but in the day of adverſity conſider: God alſo hath ſet the one over againſt the other, to the end, that Man ſhould find nothing after him.* וה לעמת זה The Septuagint Καὶ γὲ τέτῳ συμφόνως πᾶς The Latine Interpreter, *Et quidem iſtud*

istud congruum huic. Sym. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάλαγον τοῦτο ἐποιήσεν ὁ θεὸς. God hath set good over against Evil, and Evil over against Good, so to answer one another, that Man coming after him, in review and observation of his workes might not find any thing wanting, or to be added. All is full and uniform and answering. So *Seneca*,

Senec. de Provid. cap. 4.

— *Semper esse felicem, & sine morsu animi velle transire vitam*, ignorare est rerum *naturæ* alteram partem, *&c.*

So *Apuleius.*

— *Gramaticorum artes vide quæso quam ex diversis collectæ sint literis, ex quibus aliæ sunt insonæ, semisonantes aliæ, pars sonantes, hæ tamen mutuis se auxiliis adjuvantes syllabas pariunt, & de syllabis voces. Hoc Heraclitus*, &c.

So *Porphyrie.*

Porphyr. de antro Nym.

—Νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, παλίντονος ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ τοξεύει διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, &c.

And if we consider them as *dolo-*

rous and *afflictive*, so also they *are necessary in respect of God, that he may have a rise of shewing* his Beneficence and Goodness, in its full extent: For, if there were no evils in the world, no infelicities, necessities, nor miseries, there could be no *compassions*, nor no evincements of his *Tendernesses* and Mercies in relieving, or removing them. He could not shew his readiness to *Help*, if there were no *need* of help; and therefore he hath sometimes *hid* himself behind the Curtain, even from his dearest Children, that on his return on their cryes, they may be more *affected* with his kindness, and become more sensible of it, else there had been no crying to God, nor help from him, nor thanks for it: See the 107 *Psalm.* For where there are no Evils, it might be said of God, as is said of a virtuous Man, by *Seneca*,

de d. — *Magnus es vir, sed unde scio, si tibi fortuna non dat facultatem exhibendæ virtutis? &c.*

But,

But, if we consider them as *pænal Evils*, *so they have a mediate goodness, and an usefulness for Man*, that much obliges him, for so (as we have said) they are as many *Means* to discipline and govern him; who, if he were not as he is, and were not govern'd and Disciplin'd as he is, but had been fixed by an Act of Power, without *them*, half the *shew* had then been lost. So much of the Divine wisdome and goodness as is, visible in this conduct (which is very much) had then been never shewn, and so God had been deprived of a good part of his Glory. His is πολυποίκιλος σοφία, a manifold wisdome, and manifold Goodness. And manifold wisdome must be shewn in many wayes, and not be limited to one.

Well (saith the *Atheist*) *this is indeed a pretty colour, but 'tis no more, for the Government, if any, is not administred as you assert it; the Good and Evil in the world, are*

not for the ends you mention, to discipline and order it; these are too promiscuously dispens'd, and too blindly, to be so for Ends; 'tis rather to the contrary; the Good (if any difference) are most unhappy and unfortunate, and the wicked, most successful and prosperous. A Phænomenon, so Plain and obvious that not only Telamon *in* Cicero,

Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 3. Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis: quod nunc abest.

But also Solomon *himself hath noted it; no man (*saith he*) knoweth, either love or hatred by all that is before him, all things come alike to all, there is one event to the Righteous and to the Wicked,* &c. *So undistinguishing and common are the external accidents. And 'tis strange, if there be indeed a Providence, that the Godly only should have the Promise of the present life, but no more the performance of it, than the Wicked.*

SECT.

SECT. 4.

The Objection remov'd. (1.) *By denying its Ground: for all is Good to the Good, and Evil to the Evil.* (2.) *By ſettling this Rule. That Providence is not to be underſtood but in the End. This illuſtrated by ſeveral Reſemblances, and by an Inſtance. The promiſcuouſneſs of Providence in events explained. External things indifferent in their own Nature, and nor Good nor Evil. Seemingly promiſcuous Providence further vindicated, by ſeveral conſiderations. The falſe meaſure of Good and Evil detected. A right one ſettled.*

This *Appearance*, I acknowledge, hath offended very many, and till he went into the Sanctuary, and there obſerv'd the *End*, it ſcandalized *David*: But *Seneca* hath fully ſolved it, and ſo hath *Plutarch* alſo, and *Arrian*'s *Epictetus*, a Trium-

virate of worthy Authors, and let the Atheist read them. He is mistaken, *there is nothing Good in this Life to the Evil, and to the good and vertuous nothing is amisse and bad. Trahit quisq; in suum colorem.* To the Pure all things are Pure, The famous, but, &c. Story of the Angel, and unbelieving Hermite (that which *Bradwardine* relates, if yet it be a History) abundantly illustrates it. All things work together, in the *End*, for Good to one, and all for Evil to the other. You must take a Providence entire and altogether, and not in pieces and abroad, to make a Judgment on it. All is as the End is. That is well, which ends well, and that is otherwise, which ends so. You must stay the End to judge it; [the End of the Providence, and the End of the Man] Now *marke the Perfect man, and behold the Upright, for the* End *of that Man is peace, but the Transgressors shall be destroyd together, the End of the Wicked shall be*

be cut off. Two sorts of Men, and answerably two Ends; Heaven and Hell.

So *Porphyrie* out of *Plato*.

—— Δύο δὲ στόμια Πλάτων φησί· δι' οὗ μὲν ἀναβαινόντων εἰς οὐρανόν· δι' οὗ δὲ κατιόντων εἰς γῆν.

And again.

—— Πανταχοῦ τοίνυν τοῦ διθύρου φύσεως ὄντος συμβόλου. εἰκότως καὶ ἄντρον οὐ μονόθυρον, ἀλλὰ δύο ἔχον θύρας, ὡσαύτως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξηλλαγμένας. καὶ τὰς μὲν, θεοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς προσεκούσας· τὰς δὲ, θνητοῖς καὶ φαυλοτέροις

The *Providence of God* is what *Augustus* thought it,

Δότε κρότον, καὶ πάντες ὑμεῖς μετὰ χαρᾶς κτυπήσατε.

Suetin in vit. Octav. August.

a well composed Drama; wherein a man is so surpriz'd and intricated with *Variety*, that all along he cannot once imagine its design, until he come to the *End* of it; and then he sees it clearly, how every Passage and adventure in the whole most excellently contribute to it, and most orderly. And surely, *he that believeth* (and Religion obligeth

eth men to be believers) *maketh no haſte*; One muſt await the End, to ſee the whole laid open. It is the excellency of a *Work*, to have its main deſign ſo ſkilfully conceal'd, as to ſuſpend Spectators, and to lead them all about in a-*maze*, until it all be finiſh't. The Atheiſt lookes but to a *part*, when he ſhould ſtay to ſee the *whole*; at leaſt the whole piece. He ſeeth but the wrong ſide of the *Arras*, the thrums and ends of the threads, when it is rowled up; the Beauty is in the right ſide, and he muſt ſtay the *opening* to ſee it. 'Tis unreaſonable to complain of that in Providence, which he calls an *Ornament, and which doth make his greateſt pleaſure and delight in Playes and Romances*, viz. The *interruption of the Story, and that ſuſpence which is in it.* We muſt ſtay the end of all to ſee the Harmony of all, and *the laſt day will declare it*; and we muſt ſtay the end of every piece of Providence,

to

to make a judgement on that.

But, to give a Scriptural inſtance in the Hiſtory of *Joſeph* (not to mention that of *Job* or *David*,) what a marvellous ſurprize is in it! Take every paſſage of it ſolely by it ſelf, and ſeparate it from the reſt, and how hard a one it is; *all is then againſt him*: To be hated by his brethren, that is bad; to be ſold by them for a Slave to the *Iſhmaelites*, and by theſe to *Potiphar* is worſe; to be injuriouſly accuſed of his Miſtreſs, and ſo condemn'd to perpetual Priſonment, worſt of all. All theſe are hard, and *ſeparately* all againſt him; but in *concatenation and together*, as one diſpoſeth and prepareth for another, ſo they all *co-operate* in the *End* to his preferment, and are *all for him.*

For it was by the *Buttler* whoſe Dream he had interpreted, that ſuch a *mention* was made in favour of him unto *Pharaoh*, as occaſion'd his Preferment. It was in *Priſon* he

be

became acquainted with the Buttler, and interpreted his Dream; it was his *Mistress's Accusation*, which compos'd his *Mittimus*, and hurried him to Prison; it was the avarice and griping of the *Ishmaelites*, that brought him to his Mistress; and it was the Malice and *Envy of his Brethren*, that brought him to the *Ishmaelites*; and *thus he comes to Preferment*, and who would have thought it thus? *All work together*, and in the *End for Good*. Such an Ordering and over-ruling hand hath God in all the evil actions of Men; when *Josephs* Brethren *sell* him into *Ægypt*: God is said to *send* him. Humane Malice and Divine Providence, may be together in the same act; wherein Men have an evil hand, God hath a good one; who brings Light out of Darkness, and turns Evil in the *End* to Good. This for Particular Providence.

Hear *Seneca*.

Senec. cur. bon. vir. mal. sent. cap. 3.

— *Difficillimum ex omnibus quæ pro-*

proposui, videtur quod primum dixi: pro ipsis esse quibus *eveniunt, ista quæ horremus, ac tremimus. Pro ipsis est, inquis, in exilium projici, in egestatem deduci, liberos, conjugem efferre, ignominia affici, debilitari? Si miraris,* hoc pro aliquo esse, *miraberis quosdam ferro & igne curari nec minus fame ac siti, Sed si cogitaveris tecum, remedii causa, quibusdam & radi ossa & legi, & extrahi venas, & quædam amputari membra, quæ sine totius pernicie corporis hærere non poterant: hoc quoq; patieris probari tibi, quædam* incommoda pro his *esse, quibus accidunt: tam me hercules, quam quædam quæ laudantur atque appetuntur,* contra eos esse, *quos delectaverunt, similima cruditatibus, ebrietatibusq; & cæteris quæ necant per voluptatem,* &c.

Once, *it is the End of all* (as we have evidenc'd) *that must open and unlock the Cabala, and Mystery of things at full*; and if it be, then certainly, in being so precipitate and

and haſty, as not to ſtay it, to make a ſettled and eſtabliſh't judgment, we as well betray an exraordinary Ignorance, and Folly, as a like Temerity and Raſhneſs. For though there be a viſible and apparent correſpondency in *ſome* adminiſtrations, [Good in the End of them to the Good, as to *Job*, to *Joſeph*, to *David*; and Evil at the furtheſt, in the End of them to the Evil, as in *Adonibezek*, *Pherecydes Syrus*, *Attila*, &c.] That we may acknowledge the righteouſneſs and juſtice, which doth rule the world; yet it is obſcure and hid in *many* others, that we may alſo know there is *another day to come*, that muſt more fully declare it. *Some Mens ſins go before to judgement, and others follow after.* So *Job* 21. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 30. (*the wicked*) *ſpend their Daies in wealth, and in a moment go down to the Grave.* (But) *He is reſerved to the* day of Deſtruction, *they ſhall be brought forth to the* Day *of wrath.*

It

It was *this conſideration ſatisfied many* thinking *and inquiſitive Philoſophers*, about the ſeeming inæquality of things, who had otherwiſe been foundred on the ſame Rock with *Diagoras Melius*, [One of them, that made at firſt a great Profeſſion of Religion and Piety, but did afterward abandon and forſake it, utterly denying the Being, and Exiſtance of God, becauſe he ſaw not ſpeedy vengeance executed by him, on his perjur'd Friend, with whom he had depoſited his money, and who forſwore it.] But *thoſe being throughly perſwaded of a Future day of judgement*, and that there was a *Minos, or a Radamanthos, or an Æacus, a* righteous and ſevere Judge, who would accurately ſcan there in the Lives and Actions of all men, and then accordingly retribute to them, as he found upon reſearch; They acquieſced in that, and ſo ſhould we. For *when things are try'd, the Heavens ſhall record that*

Righte-

Righteousness of God. Hear the Grave *Plutarch.*

Plutarch de consolat. ad Apoll

—— Ἔπειτα γυμνοὶς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων. Τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωρουῶτα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον ἁπάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα ἡ κρίσις δικαία ᾖ. ἐγὼ οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερον ἢ ὑμεῖς, ἐποιεσάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθον, ἵνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἐυρώπης, Αἰακόν.

SECT. 5.

Again, though all things for the *Matter* come alike to all, and so there is but one event both to the Righteous and the Wicked, yet *formally*, and in respect of Good and Evil, so they do not; the same event *is sanctified to the one, which is not to the other*; so that to the one it is Good, and to the other Evil: Fortune (as they call it) as well *Adverse as Prosperous*,

rous, it makes a Good man better, and ſo is good to him; but a Bad man worſe, and ſo to him it is Evil. So *Epictetus*.

——Ἐμοὶ δ' πάντα αἴτια σημαλεῖται, ἐὰν ἐγὼ θέλω. Ὅ, τι γὰρ ἂν τούτων ἐπιβαίνῃ, ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν, ὠφεληθῆναι ἀπ' αὐτῶ. *Epict in Enchirid. cap. 24.*

Arrianus.

——Φέρε γὰρ ὦ Ζεῦ, ἵνα θέλεις πείσασιν; ἔχω γὰρ παρασκευὴν ἐν σοὶ δεδομένην, καὶ ἀφορμὰς, πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῆς ἐπιβαινόντων ἐμαυτόν. *Arrian. Epict. lib. c. 6.*

Seneca.

——*Nihil accidere* bono viro mali poteſt. *Non miſcentur contraria—— Manet in ſtatu, & quicquid evenit in ſuum colorem trahit.* *Senec. cur. bon. vi. mal. fiant. cap. 1.*

So *Socrates*.

——*Nec enim cuiquam* bono mali quidquam *evenire poteſt, nec vivo, nec mortuo: nec* unquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur. *Nec mihi ipſi hoc accidit fortuitò, nec verè iis, a quibus accuſatus ſum, aut a quibus condemnatus habeo quòd ſuccenſeam, niſi quod mihi nocere ſe* crediderunt. *Orat. ad Iudic. in Cicer. Tuſc. Quæſt. l. 1.*

Now Events *Materially* accept-

ed, and as in themſelves, ſo *they are not markes to judge by, either of the Love* or Hatred, which Almighty God has for us, but only *Formally*, as Good and Evil, as ſanctified and unſanctified; that is, either as they are bleſſed to be Inſtruments or means of vertue, or elſe are curſed, and ſo are Riſes and occaſions of vice; or elſe of greater temporal Evils. Thus *Solomon* is underſtood. *All come alike* Materially, but not Formally. And there is the wiſedom, that when the *Events are the ſame*, the Good and Evil *are not*. And thus it is.

For *none of thoſe external things* the Atheiſt calleth Goods or Evils, *are in themſelves intrinſecally ſo*, but being in themſelves *indifferent*, are only *relatively* Good or Evil; ſo as they are either *uſed or abuſed* by thoſe that have them; and as they *prove in the end*. Mens Tables *may become ſnares*, and *out of the Eater meat may come*, and 'tis to

to ſhew *this*, that God promiſcuouſly beſtows *them*. So *Seneca*.

— *Hoc eſt propoſitum Deo, quod ſapienti viro*, oſtendere *hæc quæ vulgus appetit, quæ reformidat*, nec bona eſſe, nec mala. *Apparebunt autem bona eſſe, ſi illa non niſi bonis viris tribuerit, &c.* *Senec. cur. bon. vir. mal fiant. cap. 5.*

Again.

— *Divitias* nego bonum eſſe: *nam ſi eſſent, bonos facerent.* *Senec de vit. beat. cap. 24.*

All Goodneſs, *it conſiſteth in relation and convenience*; things are onely good, ſo far as ſutable and proper, (and) thoſe are Evil which are otherwiſe: what is one Mans meat, it is anothers poiſon; and what is good in one circumſtance is not *alwayes ſo*, but it is often very evil in another; and what ſeemeth temporally Good, as alſo Evil, for the preſent, may in the *End* prove contrary; and often doth; we daily ſee't. *Quod videtur non eſt.* *Vide Arrian. in Epict. ſuo lib. 4. cap 6. per totum.*

Wherefore, if God denies his Children or Servants what the Atheiſt thinketh good for them,

(becauſe it ſeemeth ſo) or elſe inflicteth on them what the Atheiſt apprehendeth Evil; he *doth the former becauſe he ſeeth, and he ſeeth furtheſt and cleareſt*, that indeed it is not good; and ſo he doth the latter, either to procure them greater Good, or for preventing greater Evil. *Arrianus* ſaw this.

Arrian. Epict. lib 4. cap. 7.

—Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο θέλω, τὸ γινόμενον. Κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὁ θεὸς θέλει, ἢ ἐγώ. Πεισθείσομαι διάκονος καὶ ἀκόλουθος ἐκείνῳ, συνορμῶ, ὁρέγομαι, ἁπλῶς συνθέλω

and this conſideration juſtifieth God.

For as *a Father who corrects his child, but to mend him*, or *who* refuſes to him a knife, wherewith he ſeeth he will cut his Fingers; or *who* abſtructs a marriage that ſeemeth advantageous to his Son, which (he foreſees) in the End will prove his Ruin; He loſes not the Reputation of a Good or Kind Father, but acquireth to it that of wiſe; *ſo alſo 'tis with God*, God is a *Good Father*,

Father, and if he afflict, *it is* (*if need be*) *but to embetter and improve* his Children; or if he refuſe them what they apprehend to be obliging, and Good, 'tis becauſe indeed it is not ſo; it would be ruinous (if he ſhould grant it) or detrimental at the leaſt, to their eternal, or elſe their temporal State. They would loſe in Goods of the mind, and in their Spiritual Comforts, what they gain in theſe of the body, or the like.

Nor has he *abſolutely promis'd Health*, or Riches, or Honour, or any one External thing, but all as far as they conferr (to us) [*no Good thing will he withhold*;] and 'tis Good he has not *abſolutely* promis'd any; ſeeing as the caſe may be, *they all may turn to hurt.* There is a *ſore Evil which I have ſeen under the Sun, namely Riches kept for the Owner's thereof to their hurt.* And there is a time *wherein one man* ruleth over another to his own hurt. *Senec. de Pro. id. c 3.*

So *Seneca*.

Senec. de vit. beat. cap. 14. — Mala pro bonis *petenti periculosum est assequi.*

Sect. 6.

And here it ought to be remarked, that a great *occasion of* mistake in this matter, is the *impertinent judgement, which is made of Good and Evil by Sense*; to reform which, we must consider that Sense is not the sole and proper *Measure* of them; there is indeed a Sensitive, but this is but an *Animal*, an inferiour Good or Evil; there is a Higher, a more exalted and Superiour, which is the Rational and Humane. It is the *Rational Appetite*, and not the Sensitive, that is the Measure of Good and Evil among *men*, that will not sink themselves to the Beasts. To man there are better Goods than the Sensitive, and worse Evils. These of Reason, are as much *Superiour* unto them of Sense, as men themselves

ſelves to *Beaſts*. Wherefore, he is no gainer, that gets but ſenſitive Good, by the loſſe of Rational. So *Seneca*.

— *Altum quiddam eſt Virtus, excelſum, regale, invictum, infatigabile: voluptas humile, ſervile, imbecillum, caducum, cujus ſtatio ac domicilium fornices & propinæ ſunt.* Sen. de vit: b at. cap. 7.

— *Quid mihi voluptatem nominas?* Hominis *bonum quæro, non* ventris, *qui pecudibus ac beluis laxior eſt.* cap. 9.

And if a Father *try his Son, or exerciſe his vertue:* and refuſe to gratifie him in a ſmall and petty Boon, but to ſee how he will take it; reſolving if he take it well, to recompence him with a greater, what injury is done the Child? or what *unkindneſs* can the Atheiſt find in the Father? And *this is the Caſe.* For no Believer is a *loſer by his Croſſes*, ſeeing if he bear them well, *his light afflictions, which are but for a moment, work out for him*

a far more exceeding] *and eternal weight of Glory.* Now a *Poet* bringeth not his *Heroe* to his utmoſt Felicity, but in the concluſion, after he hath made him give a thouſand proofs of his vertue, and hath made him paſs a thouſand *difficulties.* We muſt be at pains for heaven; *many ſhall ſeek, and ſhall not enter*; we muſt *ſtrive if we will enter.* Heaven is taken by violence. Remember the *Olympic Exerciſes.* The Apoſtle alludes to them; *So run, as you may obtain. Strive lawfully*, &c.

Sect. 7.

The Geneſis of Man and Things, the beſt Apology for Providence, againſt the cavils of the Atheiſt; and a great inſtance of Divine Benignity. The Atheiſts (1.) Objection, That God did not fix and ſettle Adam *in it, fully anſwered and expoſed as irrational. (2.) Objection, The Iniquity of God and Provi-*

Providence in concluding all men under misery, for the Sin of One: This removed and the righteousness of God asserted and vindicated.

But what does most illustriously set off the Goodness and Benignity of God beyond exception, is this consideration, that *Man was in his first Condition, made both Innocent and Happy*; placed by Divine Bounty in a Garden most delicious, and as free from all trouble, as he was from sin; he had as many Servitours obsequious to his will, while he was so to God's, as there were Creatures; nor had he any Cross Incounters or Displeasures then. And if he have occasion to *complain now* of any alteration made in it, (as it cannot be denyed, but indeed he has) it must be of *himself*, who if he be no longer Happy, it is because he is no longer Innocent, but having first revolted from his Maker; all the Creatures

tures now revolt from him. The very ground is Curſed, and he is made to ſee his Folly and his Sin together, in the Puniſhment of it. But, *from the beginning it was not ſo.* Death and Curſe came in by Sin. *Curſed is the Ground for thy ſake, in ſorrow ſhalt thou eat,* &c. Many *Heathens* ſaw this, That of *Homer* is Pertinent.

Homer. Odiſſ. a.

Ὦ πόποι, οἷον δήνυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.
Ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κακ' ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ.
Σφῆσιν ἀτα θαλίησιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλτε ἔχουσιν

Which one well tranſlates.

O Dii quàm falsè mortales numina cœli
Incuſant, cauſasq; ſibi fontemq; malorum
E vobis pendere, putant, caſusq; nefandos:
Sed nihil eſt, ſua nam pereunt ob facta ſceleſti
Ac præter fatum cumulant ſibi corde dolores.

Epithal. Pelei & Thetid.

Hear *Catullus.*

Sed poſtquam *tellus ſcelere eſt imbuta nefando,* *Juſti-*

Justitiamq; omnes cupidâ de mente fugarunt —

And *Hesiod* in his Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι, describing the *Golden Age*, doth evidently represent the State of *Man in Paradise*.

Ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι.
Χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα φῦσε μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες.

Wherein also the famous *Ovid* admirably imitates him; and what other is his Story of *Pandora*, than an Allusion to the *Fall of Man*, which was occasion'd by a Woman.

It may be *Plato and Timæus had regard to Genesis*, when they asserted nothing mortal was immediately created; for nothing was at first made so; unless you will be subtil, and distinguish accurately, by affirming that the things created, were at first *Mortalia*, though they were not *Moritura*; and be it so, yet Death came in by Sin, and so,

ſo, it could not be before it; which is as much as (probably) they meant, or we would have them to.

But if they meant it not in *that*, it is as evident as Light it ſelf, they did in *Præ-exiſtence*; [a Theory obtaining over all the World] *This being nothing but a Depravation of the Hiſtory of* Adams *Fall and his Exilement on it out of Paradiſe.* This is *Plato his deſcent of Souls.* Which whoſoever ſhall peruſe *Hierocles* his account thereof, a perſon that could well give it, muſt needs as ſoon acknowledge, as he ſhall conſider. And in regard it is important to demonſtrate this Truth, as well againſt a knot of Learned men, that underſtand it in the Letter, as for the preſent purpoſe, I ſhall here alledge *Hierocles* in his own terms, and at large,

Hierocl. in carm. Pyth. ——Κάτεισι γὰρ ἡ ἀποπίπλει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ. ὡς Εμπι-

Εμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος,
——— Φυγὰς θεόθεν, καὶ ἀλήτης,
Νείκει μαινομένῳ πίσυνος. ———
ἄνεισιδὲ, καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἕξιν ἀπολαμβάνει,
Ἐι φεύξει τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὴν ἀτερπέα χῶρον, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει,
Ἔνθα φόνος τε, κότος τε, καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν. Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες, ἄτης.
——Ἀνὰ λειμῶνά τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν. Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὴν τῆς ἄτης λειμῶνα, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπείγεται λειμῶνα. Ὃν ἀπολειπὼν, τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτεροῤῥυήσεως εἰς γήϊνον ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλιβίου — αἰῶνος ἀμελθείς. Τούτοις δὲ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐστὶ σύμφωνος περὶ μὲν τῆς καθόδου ταυτὶ λέγων. Ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπιστέσθαι μὴ ἴδῃ, καὶ τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη πτεροῤῥυήσῃ τε, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ τό τε νόμος αὐτὴν εἰς ζῶον θνητὸν εἰσοικίζεσθαι. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνόδου ταῦτα.

A Pregnant Testimony. Here's a Fall, and of Man, and for Sin. *Ate* is from חטא *Peccare. God made Man Upright, but he found out many inventions.* This is *Plato's* Descent of Souls.

But if God be infinitely Good and Pure, and Righteous, (replies the Atheist) how is it, that he did not settle

ſettle Adam *in his Innocence and Happineſs? What ſalvo hath he for his own Righteouſneſs, who ſo unmercifully ſuffered man to ſlide from His? Is he not an Acceſſory to the Crime, who (when he could prevent) permits it? He that doth not hinder Murther, or other wickedneſs, when 'tis in his Power ſo to do, is to be interpreted in all reaſon, to will it. God could have hinder'd* Adam's. *What ſay you therefore ſince he did not? How can you call him good and charitable, that would not prevent ſuch miſery? and how Righteous and Holy, that did permit ſuch ſin?*

But ſeeing nothing gives but what it has it ſelf, muſt not *he* be Holy, Pure, and Righteous, that *Formed* man ſo? and he Good, that ſo abundantly accommodated man, and freely *furniſh't* him with all conveniencies and Comforts? Now God not onely moſt Benignly created Man in Innocence and Happineſs, *but obligingly*

ly conferr'd also to Establish him and fix him in it. He ordained him a *Tree of Life* [and *Adam* might have eaten of it, if he would himself, as well as of the other of *knowledge.*] Nor was it proper that he should do more toward it. It was not congruous and fit, he should determine arbitrary and spontaneous Agents, (and let the Atheist Judge) as he had done the Natural: nor agreeable that Man, an Agent *ad utrum-libet*, one that could deliberate and act on *choice, that could freely and elective ly incline to both extreams, should be determin'd, as a Stone to one of them.* It was *fit* elective Creatures should be left to their choice; and so was Man. A Tree of Life, and a Tree of knowledge [Life and Death] were both before him, and he might take his choice. Verily, God is irrationally charged (and let *Arrianus* in his *Epictetus* judge) for not designing a perpetual happiness unto a Rational and know-

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ing Creature, in a way that was not agreeable to Reason, as sure he must, if he had settled and established a willing, a free, an arbitrary, and elective Creature, in a State *against* his will, or *without* it. Nothing wanted but mans will, to make his happiness eternal. The Tree of Life was before him, and he might have eaten, and so have lived for ever, if he would, the very *Angels* themselves in Heaven were left to their choice; and reason good sayes *Hierocles*.

Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.

—Σύμμετρος γὰρ ταῖς οὐσίαις τῶν ὅλων, καὶ ὁ τῆς προνοίας θεσμός. καὶ ὥς ἕκαστα ὑπέστη παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ, οὕτω καὶ προνοίας ἀξιοῦται.—

For if the great God should have restrained *Adam* phisically and forcibly, and not *morally* onely (as he did) and by a Law, from eating of the one Tree, or else should violently have compel'd him (as now the Atheist doth require) to pluck and eat of the other; as he had not congruously treated *Adam*, in

in the Notion of a Free and Arbitrary Agent, ſo neither had he *tryed* what he would do of himſelf. Beſides, there had not then been any *need of Law*, for as much as it had been impertinent, to interdict eating to one, that could not poſſibly eat; and then if no Law, there had been no obedience neither, and conſequently no Reward nor Puniſhment; and if no Law, no Obedience, no Reward nor Puniſhment, then no *Government* neither, and then in vain had *Adam*, in the very conſtitution of his Nature, been a governable Creature, ſeeing (if this had been) he were never to be actually governed. Natural Agents are not (properly) governed, but Morall Ones, and Moral Agents muſt be governed Morally. Hear *Arrianus*.

Arrian. Epict. lib. 1 *c.* 6.

—— Καί τοι ὄγε θεὸς ὁ μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθ' ἃς ὁσισοῦν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον, μὴ ταπεινούμενοι, μηδὲ συγκλώμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἰῶ ἀγαθῶ βασιλέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πάλεως, ἀκώλυτον

τοῦτο ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν. Οὐδ' αὐτῷ τινα πρὸς τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπῶν, ὥστε κωλύσαι ἢ εμποδίσαι. Ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα, καὶ ὑμέτερα, οὐ χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς; οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθε, τίνα εἰληφατε, καὶ παρὰ τίνος; ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες, καὶ στένοντες, οἱ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν δόντα ἀποτε τυφλωμένοι. μηδ' ἐπιγινώσκοντες τὴν ἐνεργέτην. Οἱ δ' ὑπ' ἀγεννείας εἰς μέμψεις καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα τῷ θεῷ ἐκτρεπόμενοι.

Nor is God obliged *in the Notion of Good or Righteous Governor, violently to restrain the Governed* from all unrighteousness, or to promote their weal and Good violently; that is not for a Governor (as such) to do; and therefore that God did not, is not in derogation of his Purity or Goodness. A *Governor* restraineth Evil, and advanceth Good, not by *tying* mens hands, but by enacting good *Laws*; by enforcing them with Menaces and Threats, and with Rewards and Compensations; by executing penalties on those that break them, and by renumerating those that do not.

not. And though a *Subject* be an Accessory to the Crime, and Evil which he doth not hinder, if he can, and be interpreted to will it, if he do not do his natural utmost to prevent it, because he is obliged by a Law to do so; yet the Governour that maketh Law, [he being under none, but that of *Equity and Fitness, which is to rule by Law, and as a Governour*] is not accusable of Crimes, which he forbids and Punishes. He is a good Governour, that makes good Laws, and rules by them, and not by force.

But grant it (says the Atheist) *That it was Divine Bounty to create* Adam *in a state of Happiness, and no omission, not to establish him, and fix him in it; but what equality in this, not to say what injurie, that when but One was in the Sin and guilt, he yet concludeth all men in the Punishment; as if, because the Parents eat the sowr grapes, the Childrens teeth must be on edge.* Euripides *complaint is just here*

Plutarch. de iis qui car-aNum. corrip

—— Τὰ γὰρ τεκόντων ἁμάρτηματα εἰς τοὺς ἐγγόνους τρέπονται.

I answer, There is no iniquity at all, *in imputing unto all the sin of One, when you consider that that One was All*; and those All are One. *Adam* was the whole kind; and All descendants from him, are but One *Adam*. Many members make but One whole. Mankind is a Tree, whose Root is *Adam*, all whose Children are but Branches, which deriving from him, and proceeding out of him, were at first *in* him, and so they all were; and when he sinned, not one of them but was; All were yet unborn, which must be minded.

And what maketh this consideration of the greater moment, *is another, that* Eve *herself came out of* Adam; so that *Adam* was intirely All; All are come from *Adam* and *Eve*, and *Eve* herself from *Adam*. Had there been *Non Adamites*, or *Non* intire Descendants from *Adam*, such as *Jesus Christ*, who was begotten

gotten of the Holy Spirit, it had not ſeemed reaſonable, that the Sin of *Adam*, ſhould be imputed to *them*. But ſeeing Mankind is an *Extended Adam*, and as it were, but one *ſuppoſitum*; and Actions are of ſuppoſites; though it were but He, the Root that ſinned (actually) the Guilt is yet imputed to the Branches, which were in him; it not being thought unreaſonable, that he which ſtealeth, or elſe Aſſaſſinates but with his *hand*, ſhould yet be hanged for it by the *Neck*. All are *concluded* with him, being All *included* in him. And therefore *Adams* fall, is call'd the Fall of *Man*.

This is a *Scriptural ground*

Ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον

and ſo agreeable to Reaſon that the Light of Nature ſhews it; for (beſide the uſe of Men, wherein the whole blood is looked on as tainted, if but the Father be a Traytour, and wherein nothing is more common, than for Parents to co-

venant for Children, &c.) *Plutarch* ſpeaketh home.

—— Καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἐχ ὥς τι ἡμιέργαστα πεποιημένον ἀπήλλακται τῦ γεννήσαντος· ἐξ αὐτῦ γὰρ ἐχ ὑπ' αὐτῦ γέγονεν ὥς τ' ἔχει τι χ) φέρεται ἀπ' ἐκείνε μέρος ἐν ἑαυτῷ χ) κολαζόμενον περσηκόντως χ) τιμώμενον. Εἰ δ' μὴ δόξαμι παίζειν ἐγὼ, φαιλὼ ἂν ἀνδρειάντα Κασάνδρε καταχαλκευόμενον ὑπ' Αθηναίων πάσχειν ἀδικώτερα χ) τὸ Διανυσίε σῶμα μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξοιζόμενον ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων. ἢ τὲς ἐκ γόνες αὐτῦ δίκην τίνοντας. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνδριάντι τῆς Κασάνδρε φύσεως ἀθέν ὄζει, χ) τ' νεκρὸν, ἡ Διανυσίε ψυχὴ περλέλοιπε. Νυσαίῳ δ' χ) Απολλοκράτει χ) Αντιπάτρῳ χ) Φιλίππῳ χ) τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως παισὶ τῦ πονηρῶν τὸ κυριώτατον ἐμπέφυκε χ) πάρεστι μέρος ἀχ ἥττυχαῖον ἀδὲ ἀργὸν, ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν αὐτῷ χ) τρέφονται, χ) διοικοῦνται χ) φερόμενοι· χ) ἀθέν δεινὸν ἀδ' ἄτοπον ἂν ἐκείνων ὄντες ἔχωσι τὰ ἐκείνων.

Again, if *Adam* had not lapſed, *then all Deſcendants from him had been poſſeſſed of the Happineſs which he enjoyed*, and ſo had *ſtood* with him, and the Atheiſt holds not that unreaſonable; and if it be not ſo, that he

he should *stand*, it cannot be so, he should *fall* for his Children; since it is but reason, that, if Children may be benefited and advantag'd by their Parents, they may be also disadvantag'd and disserv'd in them. *Qui sentit commodum, sentiet incommodum.* Plutarch thought so.

Ἄφεν δὲ ὦ (εἶπον) ὦ τᾶν, τὸ σφοδρὸν τοῦτο τῆς κατηγορίας, καὶ μὴ φέρε πικρῶς εἰ κολάζονταί τινες ἐκ κακῶν γεγονότες ἢ πονηρῶν, ἢ μὴ χαῖρε μηδ' ἐπαίνει τιμωμένης εὐγενείας. Δεῖ γὰρ εἰ τὴν χάριν ἐν τῷ γένει τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀνασώζομεν, εὐλόγως μηδὲ τὴν κόλασιν ὄιεσθαι δεῖν ἀπανδᾶν καὶ προαπολείπειν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀδικίαις, ἀλλὰ συνεκτρέχειν ἐκείνῃ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀντιστρόφως ἀποδιδούσῃ. Ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ κίμωνος ἡδέως ὁρῶν Ἀθηνῆσι τιμωμένοις, τῶν δὲ Λαχάρους, ἢ Ἀρίστωνος ἐκγόνων ἐλαυνομένων, ἀχθόμενος καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, ὑγρός ἐστι λίαν καὶ ῥάθυμος, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλαίτιος ὅλως καὶ δύσκολος πρὸς τὸ θεῖον.

Finally though all have Sinn'd in *Adam*, and so have Misery and Punishment entail'd upon them, *yet that misery and Punishment is*

not so great, but that there is a greater mixture of Clemency and Mercy in it; the Life is left them with entailment of calamity upon it, is yet such as *they are loath to part with*; and they *are favoured in it, with opportunities of making their condition better than at first it was*, by playing an *after Game*, Thus the Fall is made to be *good* for them, since they have a rise to get by it: and hear *Plutarch*.

—Καθόλου δ' εἶπον ὥσπερ ἐν ἰατρικῇ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι.

SECT. 8.

Divine Benignity and Goodness illustrated in his relieving Acts of Grace. Man gets by the Fall. Why his First State, though Good, was not best.

Well then God is Good; yes so infinitely Good and Bountiful, that, though man had miserably bankrupt, and fool'd all he had away; yet

yet has he of his own alone immenſe Goodneſs and Charity, *ſo ſtupendiouſly repaired him again, with ſuch a new Stock in Jeſus Chriſt*, that if he be not infinitely wanting to himſelf, as well as to his Maſter, he may be made for ever by his breaking. *God ſo* [ſo] *loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoſoever believed in him ſhould not periſh, but have everlaſting life*, Everlaſting Life.

Thus, Humane condition, it is capable of *being better'd by the Fall*, it being in the kind of Man by Grace, as 'tis in other kinds by Nature, he riſeth by his Fall; the Corn is not quickened nor multiplied, except it die; Man was not to be *quickened* by the Lord from Heaven, nor advanced from a natural into a better State of Spiritual, and Immortal Life, but after he was *Spiritually dead*. You *who were dead in treſpaſſes and ſins, hath he quickened*.

The

The Natural condition of the Man was Good in Paradiſe, and as good as that could be, but his Spiritual is better, and it was *agreeable unto the Law and Method of Nature, that what was good ſhould precede, and what was better follow after*; it being Nature's order, to proceed from things leſſe Perfect, unto things more ſo. For in the *Geneſis* of things (if you conſult it) it was firſt *Evening*, then *Morning*; firſt *Darkneſs*, then *Light*; firſt the *Naturals* were made, then the *Vegetables*; firſt the *Animals*, then the *Rationals*; and 'tis to this that our Apoſtle alludes; *The firſt man* Adam *was made a living Soul, the laſt* Adam *was made a quickning Spirit. Howbeit that was not firſt which is Spiritual: but that which is natural, and afterward that which is Spiritual. The firſt man is of the earth Earthy.* The ſecond *Man is the Lord from Heaven.* Thus is Man's Condition better'd, in that *now*, Divine Grace is brought by *Jeſus Chriſt*. SECT:

Sect. 9.

The Atheists Objection of impossible conditions, and of Reprobation destroyed, Gods Universal love evinced, Election, and Reprobation explained. Reprobation in a comparative sense vindicated. The Terms of Grace, Practicable. Humane Impotency Moral, not Physical.

Yes (sayes the Atheist) *so it lookes; for if he do extend his Grace* (*as he is said*) *to men, it is on Terms, so insupportable and hard, that they cannot possibly perform them; as if impossible conditions did not nullifie his grants, and make his Promises Denials; but that it were in his Law, as Lawers tells us it is in ours, wherein a Promise on Impossible Conditions, does immediately invest in Right. What Grace is this to look for tales of Bricks, without affording Straw? He bids*

us come inded (but when he knows we cannot) and then he tels us, we ſhall have. And is not this a great Evincement of Benignity, and love to Mankind, is it not? that he hath made the greateſt part thereof to damne it? what means Reprobation elſe?

A moſt malicious imputation this! For as *Plutarch.*

Plutarch. in Platonic. Queſtion.

——Οὐδεὶς θεὸς μόνος ἀνθρώποις.

God has not made a man to damn him; he hath an univerſal (though not an equal Love) for all the Kind: and has given ample demonſtrations of it in *his* Son: who aſſumed not the Perſon, but the Nature; *He ſo loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son,* &c. *God ſent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be ſaved.*

What Evidences are there of his Pleaſure *(let me ſee but one of it) that the wicked die?* when there *are ſo many of his will* (that) *he ſhould re-*

return from his wicked wayes, and live! Doth he not *invite* all? Doth he not *beſeech*, and *call* all? [*Ho every one that thirſteth*, &c.] Doth he not afford *ſufficient means*, and ſend his Miniſters and Word to All? Is there not an univerſal Act of Amneſty, without a Man excepted, ſo he will come in? yes verily the *Apoſtles were obliged to go to all the world*, and *preach the Goſpel to every Creature.*

And that very *Reprobation*, which is ſo great a ſcandal and offence unto the Atheiſt, onely becauſe he has no right underſtanding and reſentment of it, *what is it but a leſſer love?* It may not be interpreted in a poſitive and ſimple ſence, but onely in a comparative, as *not importing a ſimple Averſation or Hatred, but a leſſe intenſe love.* So that as they are called Choſen or Elect, *whom he eſpecially favours*, ſo theſe are *Reprobate* or hated, *whom he doth only*

only generally love, but doth not ſpecially favour. It was thus he Reprobated *Eſau*, or hated him before his doing Good or Evil, not in a poſitive and ſimple, but in a comparative ſenſe; he loved him not in that degree he loved *Jacob*, with that eſpecial and diſtinguiſhing love. And ſo *comparatively* he is ſaid to hate him; juſt as *Jeſus Chriſt* affirmeth them *to hate Father and Mother.* who love them eminently *leſſe then him*, So Scriptural a Notion this is of *Hatred.*

Now to apply it; *What if God*, who has a general and common love to all (which he hath evinced in a thouſand wayes, by his creating, his conſerving, his providing for them in the preſent life, and by capacitating of them for a better end) *have yet ſo ſpecial and diſtinguiſhing an one for others, that in reſpect thereof the former is as none?* Is he the leſs Good, or leſs Benigne, becauſe he is ſo much ſo? or muſt it be interpreted a want

of

of Goodneſs or Benignity to ſome, becauſe he is abundant in it to others? as if it were not Righteous for the Great God to have his *Favourites*, when yet it is allowed and approved in men to have them. God doth but *generally love* ſome, to ſhew his *Power*; and he *ſpecially doth favour* others, to ſhew his *Rich Grace*. Had he loved all a like, it would not look of Grace to any. Grace is Favour, and Favour is particular, and diſtinguiſhing. Nor had he ſhew'n his power, if he had not *paſſed ſome by*, when he obliged others with Favours.

So infinitely Good is God; that the veryeſt Reprobate in all the world, has no occaſion of a juſt complant againſt him; *He is as good as Soveraign*, and to manifeſt himſelf ſo, *he has in all Tranſactions ſo admirably temper'd Love and Power, that if* he is Soveraignly Gratious in ſome of them, He is in others as Benignly Soveraign: though he Fa-

Favours some and not others, and that because he will, yet he has an universal love and general kindness for them all. Those that are not *Favourites* are yet consider'd as his *Subjects*, he willeth their Repentance, and as a Governour endeavours it; for though he use his Power and Dominion, that he might shew his *indignation against Sin*, as well as his aversion, yet *it onely is on such he has first endured with much long suffering*, who by aggravated guilt, have merited destruction, and so *have fitted and prepared themselves for it*, and now, is God Evil or Unrighteous? if you state it thus; and so Scripture states it, keep to these Termes, and Reprobation is defensible.

Nor *is God a hard Master*; he requireth not impossibilities, or Tales of Brick without Straw; for, though he might consider man in great *Justice*, *not as he hath made himself*, *but as he was made at first*, and so agreably expect from him ac-

according to the Stock, which then was given him; yet *He hath condeſcended to compound*, and by an Act of Grace, as infinite as is himſelf, has offered bankrupt *Adam New Termes, and ſuch as are agreable unto him now in this Condition, and feaſible.* I ſay now, for otherwiſe indeed *Impoſſible Conditions* (as Logicians tell us) were *refuſals*; or if, as many ſay, the Terms offered unto Man, were bottomed on Æſtimates that are not, and on conſideration of a Stock at firſt given, but which is no longer, *they were not gracious and relieving*, and conſequently could not be intended to oblige Man anew, ſince his contracted inability; but to upbraid him and reproach him with it.)

No, *God requires nothing of a Man* [not in the Covenant of Grace] *but what ſubſtantially is natural*; and let the Atheiſt or any other otherwiſe perſwaded, inſtance but in one required Act to

the contrary; to believe, to repent, to love, &c. Are Acts ſubſtantially within the compaſs of the Humane Nature, and which one exerciſes every day; He believeth ſome reports, and he Repenteth ſome Follies, he loves his Friend, &c. and God obliges him but to Believe and Credit him, to repent of Follies practiſed againſt him, and to affect and love him, as his Friend and Benefactor, the Acts ſubſtantially are the ſame, though the determinations of the Acts are not, their Moral Principles and Objects differ.

And, that *Inability, or Impotency of humane will*, which occaſions ſo great a noiſe and murmur, is not to be underſtood as if there were not in it *Natural Liberty*; *the Will of Man Eſſentially is free*, and Lady of her own actions, and its adæquate and proper object, Good; *It is not Natural but Moral impotence, an inability in the Will of willing Spiritual Good*, through *a prepoſſeſ-*

ſion

ſion of it, with ſuch reſiſtent Habits, with Love of the World, and with Luſt, as being enmity to God, and all Divine Good, do ſo powerfully chain her unto one extream, that ſhe is not capable as long as ſhe is under them, of inclining to the other. An irregenerate and unconverted man, he has the Faculty of willing, though not the exerciſe. [*Voluntatem habet, non velle.*] As one may have the *Viſive Power* in the dark, though he cannot *ſee*, but in the Light. Potentiam *habet, ſed non Poſſe*, and the Faculty of willing, Man hath, becauſe he has the Faculty of Nilling. [*& Ejus eſt velle cujus eſt nolle.*] *Boetius* proves it.

Animadverto inquit, idq; uti tu dicis ita eſſe conſentio. Sed in hac hærentium ſibi ſerie cauſarum, eſtne ulla noſtri arbitrii libertas, an ipſos quoq; humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena conſtringit. Phi. *eſt inquit, neque enim fuerit ulla* rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adſit *arbitrii*, &c. *Boet. lib. 1 Proſ.*

So that its *impotency is but vitious and habitual*, such an One as in *Truants*, that say they *cannot* learn, or in *Prejudiced Persons*, that say they *cannot* love, and indeed but very hardly can, as long as they are so; both which *experience* in themselves, something rising and reluctant at the thoughts of Love and Learning; and *so do* wicked Men, who all are *Truants* and *Prejudiced* with the Love of the World, and of Lust, they have Reluctancies arising in them, at the thoughts of God, and of all true Goodness. *Intus exhistens prohibet alienum.* You must cure their prejudices to convert them.

SECT.

Sect. 10.

The Atheists Reply of Termes still impossible, though but morally so, remov'd. Man's Power, but by Gods Grace, explicated, asserted. The cures of the wither'd Arm, and of the Impotent man at Bethesda, *Emblematical. Their Application.*

Well, But call it Moral or Habituall impotency (saith the Atheist) *and render it as culpable and faulty as you can, yet, seeing it is such as Grace did find him in, it reflects as ill on that, if it be invincible and obstinate, as if it were a Physical and Simple one, what Grace is in the Terms, which neither do consider, nor relieve necessities; which oblige a man to things impossible unto him; and which exact a Victory and Conquest over prejudices that are inveterate, and Raigning, and that 'tis known, a man himself can*

never overcome, or vanquiſh? We are aſſerted dead in Treſpaſſes and Sins; that we can do nothing of our ſelves: the natural Man diſcerneth not the things of God; neither indeed can he, &c.

Then hear again, O Atheiſt, and admire, and never open more againſt Divine Goodneſs, which is much above the contradiction of the Wicked, as the Heavens themſelves above the Earth; and herein ſee it, that in the Covenant of Grace, *the Great God requireth nothing of a Man, but what he offers him his Help for,* [*in me is thy Help*] which he conferreth on him in the way of *Duty and Dependance.* So that nothing is exacted as a Term, but what a man is *able and ſufficient to perform, not from any Power in himſelf, but by the help of God,* who, by way of caution, (for the greater ſecurity of it) now keeps the whole Stock, intirely and ſolely in his *own* hand, ſeeing *Man* hath bankrupt once already with it, when

when it was in *his*, and it is his Goodneſs, to keep it for us. Now every *Man can* do with God's help, what every *Saint doth* do; Nothing without it, All with it. Not that we are *ſufficient of our ſelves to do any thing, as of our ſelves.* A Sufficiency there is, but not *of our ſelves*; our *Sufficiency is of God*, 'tis not in him that willeth, that he willeth; nor in him that runneth, that he runneth; but in God that ſheweth mercy, who giveth both to will and to do of his own good pleaſure. Man can do nothing of himſelf, that *no Fleſh might glory*; but with God's Help, he can do every thing, that he that glorieth, *might Glory in the Lord.* And men may have God's help, if they will; it is but ask, and have. But God muſt *help*, and therefore ſayes *Pythagoras.*

——46 Ἀλλ' ἔρχεϒ ἐπ' ἔργον. 49. Θεοῖσιν ἐπεϒξάμενος τελέσαι.—

Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.

And *Hierocles* on him.

Πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, συντελοῦντα διὰ βραχέων ὑπέγραψεν ὁ λόγος, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ συνέργειαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αἵρεσις τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν θεόθεν ἔχοντες, τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου συνεργείας, καὶ ΤΕΛΕΙΩΣΕΩΣ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάντως που χρήζομεν. Ἔοι κε γὰρ τὸ μὲν παρ' ἡμῶν σπουδαζομένον ἐκτεινομένη χειρὶ πρὸς λῆψιν τῶν καλῶν τὸ δὲ παρὰ θεοῦ συντελούμενον χορηγία εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τῆς δόσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξ εὑρίσκειν πεφυκέναι τὰ καλά. Τὸ δὲ ἐκφαίνειν τῷ ζητοῦντι ὀρθῶς. Ἡ δὲ ΕΥΧΗ μεθόριον εἶναι τῆς τε παρ' ἡμῶν ζητήσεως, καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόσεως, ἐχομένη τῆς αἰτίας ἡμῶν, τῆς εἰς τε τὸ εἶναι προαγούσης ἡμᾶς, καὶ πρὸς τὸ εὖ εἶναι τελειούσης.

And *Plutarch*.

— Ἅις οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀκούσιον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐκουσίῳ δίδωσιν ἀρχὴν, καὶ τὸ θαῤῥεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλπίζειν προστίθησιν. ἢ γὰρ ἀπαλλακτέον ὅλως τὰ θεῖα πάσης αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχῆς τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἢ τις ἂν ἄλλος εἴη τρόπος ᾧ βοηθοῦσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ συνεργοῦσιν;

Plutarch. C. Marc. Coriolanus.

and God will *help* if Men will *try*. So *Aeschylus*.

— Ἀλλ' ὅταν σπωδῇ τις αὐτὸς καὶ θεὸς συνάπτεται.

This

This *Concernment* and Transaction of Almighty God with men is admirably represented in the Method of Jesus Christ used when he *cur'd the Impotent* and Lame; For Instance, when he cur'd the *wither'd hand*; which he did, by bidding him that had it, *stretch* it out: and so that other impotent and maimed man, at *Bethesda*, who could hardly stir his hand or foot; by bidding him *take up his bed and walk*.

One would have thought he had but *mocked*, to bid the wither'd arm be extended, or the Impotent to take his bed and walk; to bid them go that had no legs; but they *believed* him to be serious, and that he was able to enable them, and therefore *tryed* and in trying found ability *come in*. And so it is with us, we are *unable* in our selves for all the duties he obliges to, we are bid *to stretch our wither'd arms out*, to believe, to love, to obey him spiritually, and

(as

(as it were) to take up our beds and walk, when we *are impotent and lame*; but yet on such a *trying* he enables us; vertue comes in with our obedience, if we believe. It is not *means* but Gods *blessing*. And your *Indeavours* are to be in Gods name, and not in your *own*. Many have indeavour'd in their own strength, and fal'n short; you must try in Gods, and so you can do every thing. You say you *cannot* come, when God obliges you; but pray try. Can't you pray, can't you hear (the Word) can't you read? &c. *Try in Gods Name*. Do what you *can*. If men will not try, when God saith he'l help; 'tis of perverseness, and not of impotence, that they do not come. Love *offers* help to all, but Grace *gives* help to some. All *may* have it if they will, but some *shall will* to have it. If any be lost 'tis of their own Wills, but if any be sav'd, 'tis long of God's. God *is willing* indeed (as General *Rector*)

ctor (that all *should* be saved, but he doth not *will*, or decree (as a special *Father*) that all *shall* be saved.

Sect. 18.

A foolish Objection from the immaturity, and imperfection of the Divine Life here proposed, and the Vanity of it detected.

But may the Atheist say, what need so much adoe then, for man to pray, and hear, and read, and meditate, and try, if God do all? And why is the Life of God in men so long imperfect, when if he were good, he would, and, if he would, he could at once immediately accomplish it? why doth he let them creep, whom he could make to flie, and so defer that utmost happiness and perfection, which he is said to ordain them to, when, if he would, he might as soon possesse them of it, as design it.

I anſwer, *There are means as well as ends*, and wiſdome lies in ſuting them; the Atheiſt might as well require, *that* every thing in Nature ſhould immediately, without an orderly progreſſion and advancemen, arrive unto perfection, *that* there ſhould immediately be Trees, without ſeeds; and growing, and thoſe immediately ſhould bear fruit, without bloſſoming before; as what he doth. For, *as it is in other kindes, ſo it is in Mankind*, both as to his Naturals and Morals, he muſt orderly advance, and *grow in uſe of means*, from an imperfect, immature, unripe eſtate unto a perfect, and mature. The *Newman* hath Ages, as the *Natural*. God is uniform in his workes: Grace hath its *orderly advancements* and Progreſſions, as well as Nature. We muſt *Grow in Grace, toward the meaſure of the Stature*, as we do in Nature. We are born Infants and not Men.

SECT.

Sect. 12.

A brief transition toward, a Conclusion on this Head. The excellency of Divine Goodness; it maketh God most lovely, and is the Ground of all Devotion.

Thus (as I was capable) I have explained and asserted the Divine Bonity, and also the Bounty, and Beneficence of God, which is, his most (1.) *illustrious Attribute*, and that which maketh him most *Dear*, most amiable, and most desireable to men, and which is the (2.) *ligament and Bond of all Devotion to him.* For so *Cicero.*

— (1.) *Ipse Jupiter, id est juvans pater, quem conversis casibus appellamus a juvando Jovem, à poetis pater divumque hominumq; dicitur, a majoribus autem nostris,* optimus *maximus, & quidem* ante optimus id est, beneficentissimus, *quam maximus: quia majus est,* certeq; gratius

Cicer de nat. deor. lib. 2.

tius *prodesse omnibus, quam opes magnas habere, &c.*

Cic. de nat Deor. lib. 1

— *Quid est melius, aut quid praestantius bonitate & beneficentia? quâ cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo, nec deum, nec hominem* carum, *neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligi vultis.*

Ibid.

—(2.) *Quæ porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? Est enim pietas, justitia adversum deos: cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum: qui quamobrem colendi sint, non intelligo, nullo nec accepto ab iis, nec sperato bono.*

And there is nothing can administer to Men, in all their *fluctuations* and perplexities, a *greater Consolation, than this consideration, that the World hath a Governour,* and him a good one; *that* the Ship is not without a Pilot, nor the

Apul. de Mundo.

nor the House without a Master; but *that* every thing is order'd as well by infinite, and carefull, and supream Goodness, as by most excellent wisdome. So *Arrianus*.

Arrian. Epict. lib. 1. cap. 7.

—Δια τί δὲ φοβεθήσεταί τι τῶν γινομένων ἐν ἀνθρώποις; ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν Καίσαρα ἡ συγγένεια, ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἱκανὴ παρέχειν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ διάγοντας, καὶ ἀκαταφρονήτως, καὶ δεδοικότας μηδ' ὁτι οὖν· τὸ δὲ τὴν θεὸν ποιητὴν ἔχειν, καὶ πατέρα, καὶ κηδεμόνα, οὐκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐξαιρήσεται λυπων καὶ φόβων; καὶ πόθεν φάγω, φησὶ, μηδὲν ἔχων;

So *Seneca*.

—*Ideo fortiter omne ferendum est: quia non, ut putamus, incidunt cuncta, sed veniunt, Olim* constitutum est, *quid gaudeas, quid fleas, &c.* 'Tis *Decreed*.

Senec. cur. bon. vir. mal. fiant. cap. 5.

SECT.

SECT. 13.

Firſt Corollarary. Nothing ſo indecent, and unbecoming for men, nor ſo diſhonourable to God, as ſuperſtitious Fears and Scruples. Several conſiderations to evince it.

And being ſo. (1.) *There is nothing more undecent and unbecoming for men, nor more diſhonourable, as well as more ungrateful to Divine Goodneſs, than ſuperſtitious Scruples, Fears, Diſtruſts, and Apprehenſions of* God; *as* if he were a Mean and Low Being, whom inſignificant and little things could either irritate or pleaſe: as if he did not know, or not conſider, *that* we are but fleſh; but *that* he weighed us in a Ballance, as by grains and ſcruples; or *that* he were inexorable, hard, and rigid. In a word, as if He were not an infinitely excellent perfect Being;

[the

[the Best] but had a Composition in his Temper, of somewhat Little, Small, Evil, and Weak. No, God looketh to the *Heart*, and so thou be *sincere*, it is enough. [But don't mistake Sincerity.] *He accepteth not according to what a Man hath not, but according to what he hath.* Mind the great Duties, and Perfections of the Humane Life, and of the Divine; and know assuredly, that God will wink at unavoidable infirmities, in thy discharging of them. Take heed of Diffidence, and Slavish Feares; and know it more obliging to the Great God to Love him cordially, than to Fear him servilely, for it is *Love*, and not *Fear*, that hath the honour to fulfil the whole Law; and let the Scrupulous consider it.

Once, a Melancholly, Scrupulous, Unchearful, and Fearful, it *is a Miserable and Forlorn Life.*

So *Plutarch.* *Plutarch. de superstit.*

—Ὁ δὲ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀρχὴν ὡς τυραν-

νίδα φοβούμενος σκευθρωπὴν καὶ ἀπαραίτητον, πᾶ μεταστῇ, πᾶ φευγῇ ποίαγγλῶ ἄθεον εὕρῃ, ποίαν θάλασσαν, εἰς τίκαταδὸς, τῶ κοσμῶ μέρος, καὶ ἀποκρύψας σεαυτὸν, ὦ ταλαί. πωρε, πιστεύσεις ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἀποπέφευγας.

and, *it also is a thing that makes a Christian as utterly unlike to Jesus Christ*, as any thing can be; *He*, came eating and drinking, in a complacent and chearful fashion, and not as *John the Baptist*, with a hair Coat and Leathern Girdle. And it *is utterly improper to the Gospel State*, in which he is, *He is not under the Law, but under Grace*: Jesus Christ is come on purpose, to *bring Life, and Immortality to Light*; *to* let him understand the infinite, and inexpressible *Good will* of God the Father; and *to* acquaint him with those eternal motions in the Heart of God in his Favour, *that* God is willing to adopt him. And this *good News* should make him to rejoyce. A little should not cloud his joyes.

The

The Apostle bids us rejoyce, and *again rejoyce*, that we may perform Duties chearfully. God loves a cherful Giver.

So *Porphyrie*.

——Μὴ παρέργως ϑ, ἀλλὰ σὺν πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ. *Porphyr de Abstinent. lib. 2.*

Believe it all our *Melancholly*, Fear, and Apprehension, saving onely so much of it, as is constitutional, *proceedeth from our ignorance of God, and of the Gospel liberty* we are redeemed into, that we don't consider (and perhaps *distemper* will not let us) that we have not now receiv'd the *Spirit of Bondage* [that Spirit of the Law] *again to Fear*, but the *Spirit of adoption*, [that Evangelical and Gospel Spirit] by which we invocate one *God as our Father*. For *we are not come unto the Mount that might be touched, and that burned with Fire, nor unto blackness, and darkness, and tempest. And the sound of a Trumpet, and the voice of words, which voice*

they that heard, intreated, that the Word ſhould not be ſpoken to them any more. (For they could not indure that which was commanded: and if ſo much as a Beaſt touch the Mountain, it ſhall be ſtoned, or thruſt through with a dart. And ſo terrible was the ſight, that Moſes *ſaid I exceedingly fear and quake.) But we are come to Mount* Sion, *and unto the City of the Living God, the heavenly* Jeruſalem, *and to an innumerable company of Angels. To the General Aſſembly and Church of the Firſt born, which are written in Heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the Spirits of Juſt men made perfect, and to* Jeſus *the Mediatour of the New Covenant, and to the blood of Sprinckling, that ſpeaketh better things than that of* Abel.

But this is not ſaid to encourage any in their inſolent Affronts, or Provocations of God. *Shall Sin abound becauſe Grace hath abounded? God forbid.* The *Goodneſs*, Pa-

Patience, Long-ſuffering, and Forbearance of Almighty God, where there is any *Ingenuity*, to take a right Impreſſion, and Reſentment of it, *Leadeth to Repentance.* Such as take incouragement (for none is given them) to do evil, becauſe they know that God is good, have reaſon to conſider, *that* there is Mercy with him, but not that he may be preſumed on, but *Feared. That* he is *Maximus* as well as *Optimus*; *That* he is Judge of all the Earth, and will as ſurely *right* himſelf as others; *that* he wanteth not Ability, if once he have the will to *Avenge.* And finally *that* Deſpiſed Bonity and Patience, will at laſt convert to Fury.

Sect. 14.

Second Corolary. Nothing ſo Decent and becoming for Men, nor ſo obliging to God, as Confidence in him, as adoring and glorifying of him. To glorifie God what. נשמה *in* Pſalm 150. *What it imports.*

Wherefore (2.) It is moſt *Decent* and becoming for Men, who are obliged of God, and know him to be good, *to acknowledge it in Prayer to him, in dependance on him, in confidence in him, and in Praiſes of him.* For to Believe, Pray, and Truſt, it is the Work of *Earth*; and to Admire, Adore, and *Praiſe*, it is the work of *Heaven*, but to be begun on Earth; 'Tis all the *Retribution* that Almighty God requires, that he be *bleſſed* for his bleſſings, which he then is, *when we return with his bleſſings, and really* (*as well*

well as verbally) acknowledge them unto him, that they are effects of his alone Bounty, *that* all derive from him, and *that* he is the Origen and source of all. *Bonus Deus* had a Temple among the *Megalopolitans*. We must Pray, and Praise. *Pausan. in Arcad.*

Praise is comely.

So *Porphyrie.* *Porphyr. de Abstinent. l.2.Sect.24*

Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως, τελῶν ἕνεκα θυτέον τοῖς θεοῖς· ἢ γὰρ διὰ τιμὴν, ἢ διὰ ΧΑΡΙΝ, ἢ διὰ χρείαν τὴν ἀγαθῶν.

So *Pythagoras* in *Iamblicus.* *Iamblic. in vit. Pythag.*

——Ἐπὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὴ θεὸς, καὶ ἔστ' πάντων κύειν, δεῖν δ' ὁμολογεῖν ἀεὶ τὸ κυεῖν τ' ἀγαθὸν ὄτι'.

For this shall every one, that is Godly Pray.

So also *Pythagoras* in *Iamblicus.* *Ibid.*

——Ἐπὶ γὰρ ὅτι τε θεὸς, καὶ ἔστ' πάντων κύειν, δεῖν ὁμολογήται παρὰ τὸ κυεῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ΑΙΤΕΙΝ.

But it ought to be remembred, that he that *Praiseth*, glorifieth God, more than he that *Prayeth*, for as much as he that prayeth, but

hopeth that he will be Good, but he that praiſeth doth acknowledge (that) *He is ſo*; and therefore, we ought not to be more in application and addreſs to God, by way of Supplication and Petition, than of Acknowledgement and Praiſe; which yet, as groſs a Piece of *Inequality* as 'tis, we all are ſubject to, who are very often infinitely more concerned, and zealous in our Prayers, than in our giving of thanks. It is becauſe, our Prayers are *for* our ſelves, but giving thanks is *to* God.

We have the *Pſalmiſt* for a great Example of our Duty; how many *Pſalms* has he compoſed all of Praiſe? the 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. and in fine, 150. are all *Laudatory*. *Praiſe ye the Lord. Praiſe God in his Sanctuary, Praiſe him in the Firmament of his Power. Praiſe him for his mighty Acts: Praiſe him according to his Excellent Greatneſs. Praiſe him with the ſound of the Trumpet, &c.*

And

And let every thing that hath breath, praiſe the Lord. Every thing that hath נְשָׁמָה. נשמה is a word affirmed of the *Rabbines*, and ſome others out of them, to be only uſed for the underſtanding, and ſuperiour part of Man, and ſo to be diſtinguiſhed from נפש, that alſo ſignifies the ſenſitive and lower. But it is a Groundleſs apprehenſion, and the preſent text evinces it ſo. For as נפש otherwhere is put for *Wind*, ſo is נשמה, here, let every thing that hath נְשָׁמָה is as much as every thing, that hath wind, Every windy and Pneumatical inſtrument; for it were Inſtruments he had invoked; the *Trumpet*, the *Pſaltery*, the *Harp*, the *Timbrel*, the *Stringed Inſtruments* and *Organs*; and let every windy and Pneumatical inſtrument, [perhaps every Muſical, whether Pneumatic or Pulſatic] let it *praiſe the Lord*; *and praiſe ye the Lord.* An *Apoſtrophe* to the Church, *q. d.* O Saints praiſe ye the Lord. And

And to what I would oblige others, that I desire my self; namely, to *admire* and adore the Providence and Bounty of the Great God, and withal implore his Favour, Assistance, and Protection: Which I shall, in Terms which *Boetius* prompts me with.

Boet. de Consolat. Philosoph. lib. 3. met. 1.

O qui perpetuâ mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum Cœliq; sator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, stabilisq; manens, das cuncta moveri
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus, verum insita summi
Forma boni, Livore carens, tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similisq; ab imagine formans,
Perfectas jubeas perfectum absolvere partes.
Tu numeris elementa ligas, ut frigida flammis,
Arida [illegible] Liquidis, ne purior ignis
Evolet, aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
Tu triplicis mediam naturæ cuncta moventem
Connectens animam, per consona membra resolvis.

Quæ

Quæ, cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
In semet reditura meat, mentemq; profundam
Circuit & simili convertit imagine cœlum.
Tu causis animas paribus, vitasq; minores
Provehis, & levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
In cœlum terramq; seres, quas lege benigna
Ad te conversas reduci facis igne reverti.
Da Pater, augustum menti conscendere sedem;
Da fontem Lustrare bonis; da luce repertâ,
In te conspicuos animi defigere visus.
Dissice terrenæ nebulas & pondera molis,
Atq; tuo splendore mica; tu namq; serenum,
Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
Principium, Vector, Dux, semita, terminus idem,

CHAP.

CHAP. III. Sect. I.

Divine Finality what. Acknowledged by Orpheus, *all the Ancients, and* Boetius. *Evinced from Divine bounty, and univerſal Efficiency. How all things are for God. His Glory internal and external. How God is glorified.*

AND ſo much for Divine Benignity, that glorious Attribute of God; the firſt Reſult of his Tranſcendent Goodneſs. There is *another*, that obliges us a little to conſider it, and *that is his Finality*, that, *whereby he is Omega, or the ultimate and furtheſt end of all things; ſo as that they are ultimately for him, as he is for himſelf.* He is the laſt, for whom are all; and ſo himſelf is for no other; for if he were, he were not laſt.

Thus *Orpheus*, or if as *Ariſtotle* tells us, there was never ſuch a Poet;

Poet; let it be as those Disciples of *Pythagoras* affirm, one *Cercops*

Apul. de Mundo.

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος

and all the Antients.

—Ὁ μὲν θεὸς ὡς περὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ ΠΑΛΑΙΟΣ λόγος ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τὰ πάντα.

Plutarch. adverſ. Cotten.

So *Boetius* alſo.

Boet. lib. 1. Proſ. 6.

— *Sed dic mihi, meminiſtine quis ſit rerum finis, quove totius natura tendat intentio.* Boet. *Audieram inquam, ſed memoriam mœror hebetavit.* Phi: *At quî ſcis unde cuncta proceſſerunt.* Boeti. *Novi inquam Deumque eſſe Mundi.* Phi. *Et quî fieri poteſt ut Principio cognito, quis ſit rerum Finis ignores.*

For if he be the beſt Being, as has already been evinc'd, it evidently follows, *that he is the laſt End*, in as much as Good and End, for all their formal Notions and Idea's be diſtinct, are yet convertible with one another. The Chiefeſt Good is All-ſufficient, and

of

of an univerſal comprehenſion, and capacity, containing in it all Good; and he muſt needs be the End of all, that containeth in himſelf the Good of all.

It might be alſo argued, and perhaps with greater evidence and perſpicuity, as *Boetius*, and the Scriptures do, from his firſt and univerſal *Agency*; for he that is the *Firſt efficient, muſt needs be the laſt End*; Being is a *Circle*, wherein it is impoſſible, but that the Alpha is Omega, and that the Point beginning All, is the *End* of it. *The Lord hath made all things* for himſelf.

And, if he be the End of all things, ſeeing that an End *is that, for which a thing is*, and ſo the End of all, is that for which all others are; it followes, that they all *are for God* [ſo our Apoſtle, to *him are all things*] or, as the Holy Scriptures alſo happily expreſſe it (they all) are *for the Glory of God.*

But

But to prevent misapprehensions, it ought to be consider'd, that Divine *Glory* is either internal or external Glory. His *Internal*, it is his *Essential Glory*, that in respect of which the Great Apostle calls him *the Glory*, and *Peter the excellent Glory*; and is as inseparably inherent to him, as is that which doth compose the *Sun*, to it. To which it is in this resembled, that 'tis as inaccessable and dazling to the mind, as this, to the Eye; and utterly uncapable of all Addition, as well as all Diminution. This is the *Finis cui*.

But this is not the *End of acquisition*, or as the *Metaphysics* stile it, the *Finis cujus*; it is not this, but his *external Glory*, that all things else are lastly for. And his *external Glory* (as it were the *shining of the Sun*) is nothing *but the Manifestation of Divine Perfections and Attributes* (which as *Aristotle* intimates are all *Glories*) in his Opera-

De Mundo lib. 1. c. 12.

Operations and Effects, in reſpect of which, when they *are ſeen, admir'd, acknowledg'd, and aſcrib'd to Him*; He is affirmed *to be Glorified*, or to have Glory given him: and this properly. For ſo *Cicero*.

Cicer. Tuſc. Quæſt. l. 3. —*Eſt enim Gloria ſolida quædam res & expreſſa, non adumbrata*, &c.

Indeed God is *ſaid* to be *Glorified*, or to have Glory given him, either Paſſively and Objectively, or elſe Actively and Formally. The Heavens above, the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and alſo the Earth below, the Minerals and Plants, and mere Animals, things that comprehend not the Divine Perfections, but as objects onely repreſent and ſhew them, do by *interpretation* give him Glory or Glorifie him in the firſt ſenſe; but *Man* himſelf, in taking Riſe from theſe to do ſo, doth perform it in the ſecond. But properly, God is *Glorious* in the former; but *Glorified*,

fied by the latter. The *Inviſible things of God, are clearly ſeen in the things that are made*, &c. There's the One. How *Excellent is thy Name in all the Earth, there is the other.* Other Beings are deſigned to Exhibit and Expreſs Divine Glory, but Man is made to view it, and acknowledge it. *All thy Workes* praiſe *thee*, but, *thy Saints* bleſs *thee.*

So *Arrianus.*

—— Τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.

So *Seneca.* — *Senec. nat. Quæſt l. 1. præfat.*

—— *Niſi ad hæc admitterer, non fuerat operæ prætium naſci.*

Sect. 2.

A Capitulation of the things to be diſcourſed. (1.) Man *not an ultimate End, evinced.* 1. *From his dependency in Being, and* 2. *From his Faculties. That he is a mediate End conceded, and argued from the authority of the Stoicks, of* Ariſtotle, *and of* Cicero, *and by* Reaſon, *from the Eſſential Notion of the world, and the Doctrine of Signatures,*

But to be more particular, (as this Subject of Divine Finality, which is of great importance, and concernment, doth engage us) I ſhall endeavour to evince diſtinctly. (1.) That *Man* is not his own End. (2.) That *another*, One above in Heaven, and the Origen and Source of all, is it. And then (3.) That the infinite *Tranſcendency* of God, or his higheſt Exaltation, and Supremacy, is the

the *ground* of his Finality; which effected, I ſhall ſhut up this Diſcourſe in two or three *Corollaries*.

And firſt, *That Man is not his own End*, is evident; For as much as *He is from another*: The Son is from the Father, and he from his, and ſo along unto the firſt, who being of the ſame kind, is as dependent as the ſecond; ſo firſt, and ſecond, and every one, is from another, and *he is for another*, and not himſelf, that is dependent; and is not from himſelf, but *from* another.

But if this firſt evincement, ſeem too Metaphyſical and Delicate, there is a ſecond, from the *Humane Faculties* and Powers, which is more Harmonious, and convincing. It is that Man himſelf is *conſtituted for addreſs to Good without him*, that he is a *willing* and *affective* Creature; that is, that he hath Will and Affections, which inclining him to Things with-

out, *tranſport* him. Now it cannot be imagined, that he ſhould be his own End, who is *connaturally carried out* to Good beyond himſelf; it being utterly impoſſible, that that ſhould be a Terminative, *Central Being*, which hath *Pondus in it*, and doth gravitate and weigh. That is off the Center which inclines and gravitates. Now the Will is *Pondus animæ*, and Love is *Exſtatical*. Man is not his own end, becauſe he is not his own Good. He is an *Appetent*, and inclining Being; and therefore his Good is all without him, becauſe his Love, and his Deſire *export* him.

I confeſs indeed He is *the viſible End of all inferiour Beings*. For though I know *Velleius*, [He in *Cicero*] *Carneades*, and many others, do ſmartly argue on the contrary; yet I alſo know, he is acknowledg'd *ſo* by *Ariſtotle*, by moſt other great Philoſophers, and generally, all the *Stoicks*,

as

as we are told by *Cicero*

— *Sunt autem alii Philoſophi, & hi qũidem magni atq; nobiles, qui deorum mente, atque ratione omnem mundum adminiſtrari & regi cenſeant: neq; vero id ſolum, ſed etiam ab iiſdem vitæ hominum conſuli, & provideri. Nam & fruges & reliqua, quæ terra pariat, & tempeſtates, ac temporum varietates, cœlique mutationes, quibus omnia quæ terra gignat, maturata pubeſcant a diis immortalibus* tribui generi humano *putant: multaq; quæ dicentur in his libris, colligunt quæ talia ſunt, ut ea ipſa dii immortales* ad uſum hominum *fabricati pæne videantur. Contra quos* Carneades, *&c.* And *Cicer de nat. deor. lib. 1.*

— *An hæc, ut ferè dicitis,* hominum cauſa, *a deo conſtituta ſunt? &c.* *Ibid.*

And, *beſide* the firſt of *Geneſis* wherein we have the *Charter of Dominion*; and the ſecond, wherein *Adam* in ſign of his Propriety, and *Right* over them, impoſeth

Names and Titles on the Creatures; there are two Conſiderations, which abundantly confirm it.

Firſt, The *World, it is called* Κόσμος, *for the Beauty, Order, Relations, and Proportions in it*, but for which it were a *Chaos*, a *Tohu Bohu*, not a World; and theſe in being Adæquate and proper Objects of the *Rational and Humane* Nature, do evidently ſhew, that it was made for this. It is the Order, Relations, and Proportions in the World, that makes it; and theſe are onely for the *underſtanding*, which alone diſcernes them; as Colours are for the ſight, and Sounds are for the hearing, and Odours are for the ſmelling, &c. There is nothing in the World, but there is a *Faculty* in Man to reach it; and *Objects* are for Faculties. And there are *Entertainments* in every Being in the World, which are not *ſo* to any other but Man; and therefore

fore, were not made for any other, but for him. Every thing hath its Beauty, its Order, and its Relation to others, which only Man diſcerneth. And *Cicero* noted it.

Cicer. de Offic. lib. 1.

— *Nec verò illa parva vis naturæ eſt, rationiſq; quod* unum *hoc animal ſentit quid ſit Ordo, quid deceat, in factis dictiſque quis ſit modus. Itaque eorum ipſorum, quæ aſpectu ſentiuntur,* nullum *aliud animal pulchritudinem, venuſtatem, convenientiam partium* ſentit.

And ſecondly, The Theory of *Signatures, which are but ſo many Hieroglyphicks, or ſacred Characters, and Notes on things, to intimate their Natures,* and Uſes, is another proof of it. For ſeeing there are ſuch impreſſions made on things by *Nature*, whereof he cannot doubt, that hath attentively conſider'd her, and that they are intelligible unto Man, and unto none beſide, it cannot be, but that they were *intended* and *alone* inten-

ded for him. How eminent a Signature is on the *Lujula*, or Woodsorrel? it exactly represents the Heart, and is *Cardiacal*, or proper for it. The Perforations of *Hypericon*, import its uses. And not to mention the *Ætites*, the Speckled *Jasper*, and other Stones; there are remarkable Resemblances on *Pulmonaria maculosa*, or the Sage of *Jerusalem*? on the *Lesser Celondine*; on the Dragons; on the common *Pimpinel*, and on all the *Orchis*, &c. And there are Agreable Effects performed by them. Such as are curious may consult *Crollius*, and other learned Writers.

SECT.

Sect. 3.

One above, who is demonstrated the Maker of Man, and other things, is also evinced his End. (1.) *From Congruity.* (2.) *The limitation of inferiours in their services of Man, and* (3.) *from the Harmony of the World.*

But *Man* though he be the visible and immediate End of all things in the World, yet, not *being the Author or Original of any in it, He is obliged to send to One above himself*, Who having *made* those other things, and also so *design'd* them for *Man*, as that he cannot but confess he could not do it for himself, is to be acknowledged as much Superiour and above *him* in Efficiency and Power, as in Beneficence and Bounty. And this is the *second thing I promised to evince.*

For those other things are evidently

dently, *for the uſe and ends of Man, they are ſo apt and fit to them*; and conſequently being for an End, it cannot be, but they muſt have an *Efficient*. [Whatſoever is for ſomewhat, alſo is from ſomewhat] and it cannot be from Man (that) they ſhould be, *who is ſo indigent* to live upon them; it being unimaginable, how a thing ſhould be from him, who cannot be *himſelf* without it. Now Man ſubſiſts on the *Elements*, and on *Elementary concretes*.

It remaineth then, there *is another Being they are from*, which is infinitely much above the Humane; of which it is as well the Origen and Source, as of thoſe other. For ſeeing it is utterly impoſſible, that Man himſelf ſhould be *unmade*, who *cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt, or be without the things made*: 'Tis moſt agreable that he ſhould have the making of *him*, who hath the making of the *things on* which he lives. I ſay, 'tis moſt

rat=

rational, that he ſhould make Man, if he be made (as he is proved to be) who, by providing for him, conſerves him. Thus other things and Man himſelf, lead us up to *one above Man.*

Now, admitting that Man hath ſuch an *Authour* of his Being, as is infinitely much above him, (for he made him) and hath bountifully made all others, to accommodate and ſerve him; how can it be imagined, but that he is for *this?* For 'tis not to be thought, that *God*, who had ſo great conſiderations for another, ſhould incurioufly neglect *himſelf*, but that rather, ſeeing he hath made ſo many things for Man's Ends, he made Man, and all things elſe for his own, and *in conſtituting Man a kind of God to* them, and ſo capacitating of him to receive *Duties*, did but agreably inſtruct him in *thoſe* other, which he is to pay. For what he looketh for, from thoſe beneath him, why ſhould

Iamblic. in Protrept.

ſhould he refuſe to one ſo much above him, who made him for himſelf.

And that he hath done ſo, the Humane *Faculties* do further ſhew, For as much as *Man hath both a mind* and *Underſtanding capable of apprehending God, and of converſing with him, and a will alſo as capable* of weighing and inclining to him; and what other demonſtration can a Man expect in Nature, of his being formed to maintain an intercourſe with God, to glorifie him in the World, and to recognize him as the firſt Efficient, and the laſt End, as All-mighty, and All-Good, and by doing it to be conformed to him, but that he is inabled and proportion'd by him to do ſo? What Evidence we have to convince us, that the Eye was made to ſee colours, that very ſame we have to prove that our underſtandings and Wills were ordain'd to converſe with God: for we can Apprehend him,

him, Love him, Desire him, and Delight in him, and therefore were ordained to do so. *Porphyrie* is full, this is that Mans End.

—— Τριῶν γὰρ φασὶν ὡς καθ' ἕκαστον σκοπὸν τελῶν ὄντων, ἡμῖν τοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θεωρίας τὸ τέλος, τῆς τεύξεως τελούσης τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἡμετέραν σύμφυσιν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ θεωρουμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὄντως ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἀναδρομή, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντως σύμφυσις. Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ὄντως νοῦς. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ τέλος, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ νοῦν. *Porphyr. de Abstinent. l. 1. Sect. 29*

But *Iamblicus* is fuller.

—— Ἔργον σοφίας τοῦτο δοκεῖμοι ἦμεν ποθ', ὥσπερ καὶ γέγονε καὶ συνέστα ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὀργανάτε καὶ δυνάμεις εἴληνε παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. *Iamblic. Protrept. cap. 3.*

This is abundantly *confirm'd*, in that *Inferiour Beings are so confin'd and qualified in their services to Man*, that they do him none, but in *Dependance* on a Superiour. For instance, the Soil it self, for all the pains and industry the Husband-man is at in cultivating and manu-

manuring it, will afford him nothing without *the Rain from Heaven*, which makes the fruitful Seaſons. And who holds the Key of Rain but God? The *Athenians* acknowledg'd it; they own'd a *Jupiter Pluvius*. [So *Pauſanias* tells us] and alſo the *Arcadians*, who ſaught it of him, when they needed it. In a word all *Greece* acknowledged it, when deſtitute of rain, they ſent to *Delphos*. The ſame *Pauſanias* reports the whole paſſage.

Pauſan. in Attic.

Pauſan. in Corinthiac.

Idem in Arcad.

Id. in Corinthiac. Romul. Amaſæo. Interpret.

—— *Cum diuturna ſiccitate Græcia laboraret ac non minus reliqua, quæ extra Iſthmum eſt, Græcia quam tota* Peleponneſus *cæleſtium aquarum penuria affecta eſſet, miſſi* Delphos *ſunt, qui ex oraculo calamitatis cauſam ac remedium cognoſcerent*, &c.

This is the very Argument by which the great *Apoſtle doth eſtabliſh the belief of both the Divine Being and Beneficence among the Lyſtrians*, when (as the Text implies) by

by way of obviation to the Doctrines of the *Zabi*, and others, who ascrib'd them unto their vanities and Idols, he asserteth Rain from Heaven and fruitful Seasons made by it, to proceed from God alone, who is the Living and Almighty. For, sayes he, they *Witness* for Almighty God [*He left not himself without Witness*] That he is above, that he is gracious and benign, and that by reserving in his own power, things so absolutely necessary both for humane subsistance, and for that of all things living, he doth at once remind us of the indissolvable and strict dependance, which we all have on him, and also of the Deference and Duty we owe him. If God give gifts, we owe acknowledgements; Rain and fruitful Seasons come down, and therefore Man must look up. The year makes the encrease; but God makes the year. This the *Gentiles* acknowledg'd. *Jupiter Pluvius had an Altar.*

So

So *Pausanias.*

In Attic. *Est item ara ibidem. alia, ad quam* Jovi, *quem modò* Pluvium, *modo* Innoxium *appellant, rem divinam faciunt.*

And the Ancients paid their *first Fruits.*

So *Porphyrie.*

Porphyr. de Abstinent. Sect. 27. — Sect. 27. Ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ δὴ καρπῶν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς θεοῖς θυσίαι.

and he thought it reasonable,

Ibid. Sect. 24. — Καθάπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν οὕτω κἀκείνοις ἡγόμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπαρχάς.

And in fine the *Harmony of things evinces it*; there is a visible *subordination* in the world, of the lower to the higher Region: This Earth depends on Heaven; the motions of Celestial Bodies, inspire and continue those of the Earthly, the Sun by its accesse unto us, and its removal from us, makes the Seasons; Particular causes, those are here below, but all the universal are *above*, as who would say, the cause *of all is there.*

SECT.

Sect. 4.

The Supremacy of God the Ground of his Finality, evinc'd to be so Harmonically.

And 'tis most apparent from what I have already argued, that *it is the infinite Transcendency, Supremacy, Superlative Eminency of Almighty God* (which I promis'd to demonstrate in the *third* place) that is the *Ground of his Finality:* That therefore he alone is the Ultimate and furthest end of all things, because he is most Eminent and High, and *One above them all.*

To confirm this, I shall but offer one consideration (more then what I have already) That there is a visible Subordination and Design in things; that the Earth is for the Grass, the Grass is for the Beasts, the Beasts, and Grass, and Earth, are for Man; one thing for another

but all in ſuch Relation, that what is Higher and Superiour, is the End of what is Lower and Inferiour; The Earth is for the Vegetables, the Vegetables for the Senſibles, the Senſibles are for the Rationals, the Lower for the Higher; and therefore the Rational and all for the *Higheſt*. All for God, and *Hoſea's climax* intimates it.

Sect. 5.

Three Corollaries deduc'd. (1,) *Man ought to be at God's diſpoſe. Hard Apprehenſions of God anticipated.* Epictetus *urged.* (2.) *All ought ultimately to be referr'd to to God's Glory, and how that is done. God to be injoyed, not uſed. Wherein Bleſſedneſs conſiſts.*

And firſt it Evidently followes, that if Almighty God be Man's End, he ought to be his *Meaſure*: and that 'tis infinitely more agreable

able *that man ſhould abſolutely be at Gods diſpoſe and beck, than that the Beaſts ſhould be at Man's*; he being infinitely more inferiour unto God, than the meaneſt Creatures are to him. And what if God hath loved *Eſau* leſſe than *Jacob*, and make his power known in ſome, &c.

What? are Inferiour *Animals* ſo much at Man's will, as that they live and die at his diſpoſe and pleaſure, and ſhall Man himſelf repine to be at Gods? bethink thy ſelf a little, O thou Man that murmureſt, is not he thy Maker? Thou art not thy Beaſts, which yet thou travelleſt, laboureſt, ſlaughtereſt, and fatteſt but for ſlaughter. Doth not he ſupport thee in thy Being, which he firſt gave thee? Haſt thou any thing that is not his? Who then art thou, O Man, that durſt diſpute? *Hath not the Potter power over the clay*? Shall not that be reaſon for God, which is for thee? to do

with his own, as he liſts? The Beaſts are made for *thee*; but thou thy ſelf for God.

Remember *Epictetus*.

Epict in Enchirid. cap. 77, 78, 79.

[Ἐπὶ παντὸς πρόχειρον, ἐυκλέον ταῦτα. Ἄγε δὴ με ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθ' [ὑμῖν] ἡμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς | ἕψομαι] ἑψομαί γε ἀόκνως· Ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, [κακὸς γενόμενος] οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

Κεφ. οή.

ΟΣΤΙΣ δ' [ἂν] ἀνάγκῃ συγκεχώρηκε καλῶς, σοφὸς παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὰ θεῖα δόξαται.

Κεφ. οϑ'.

Ἀλλ' [ὦ Κρίτων] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὦ Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω· ἐμὲ γὰρ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύναται, βλάψαι δὲ οὐ.

And Secondly, If God be our ultimate and furtheſt End, it will become us to refer in all things to him, *whether we eat or drink, or what ever we do; let all be done to the glory of God*; which as we then perform *Actually*, when in doing any thing we actually do mind it, ſo we alſo then *implicitely*

ly and *virtually* at least do so, when we perform all as he will have us according to the Gospel Rule; for example, when we eat and drink moderately, temperately, justly, and as the Gospel doth oblige us with due *acknowledgement* and giving of thanks.

Hear *Arrianus*. *Arrian. Epict. lib. 1. ap. 13.*

Πυθομένου τινὸς, πῶς ἔστιν ἐσθίειν ἀρεστῶς θεοῖς, εἰ δικαίως ἔστιν ἔφη, καὶ εὐγνωμόνως. καὶ ἴσως, καὶ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ κοσμίως, οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀρεστῶς τοῖς θεοῖς;

Finally if God be our ultimate and last End, we are not to imagine *we may use him as an instrument and means to rise by*, as those who make Religion, but a point of interest, a Tool of State, or else a Stale to other Matters; he is an End and not a Means. But, we must consider him, as the only Maker of our utmost Happiness, and as that central, infinite, and comprehensive Good, who being infinitely *blessed in conversing with himself, and in enjoying*

of

of his own Fulneſs, doth render others *ſo by their enjoyments of him, and converſes with him.* Bleſſedneſs is nothing but a *State of aggregation of all Good*, and he is in it, that hath a ful enjoyment and fruition of God. God is all Good. He is ſelf happy; Happy *Eſſendo*, We are happy in him, by *Union & conjunction* to him, happy *Fruendo.*

He that is joyned unto the Lord is one Spirit.

So *Porphyrie.*

Porphyr. Sentent par 2. Sect. 34.

——Ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις οὐκ ἐῶ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦ μετέχειν δυναμένην, καὶ ἀγαθοειδές. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠρόστο ἐν κακῷ. Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ ἐν τῷ σωθῆναι τῷ γεννήσαντι——

So *Seneca,*

Senec. nat. Quæſt l. 1. præfat.

— *Virtus quam affectamus magnifica eſt. Non quia* per ſe beatum *eſt, malo caruiſſe; ſed quia animum laxat, ac præparet ad cognitionem cœleſtium*, dignumque *efficit, qui in CONSORTIUM DEI veniat,*

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